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INTRODUCTION

"Hold the public schools accountable!" This clarion cry, first heard
in state capitals in the late 1980s, has since been repeated and
amplified by many states, by the courts, and most recently, by the
federal government. Only where school districts and schools are
held to "account," the theory goes, ought one expect any program of
school reform to be truly effective. Because unaccountable school
districts lack incentives to succeed, waves of school reform have
been able to wash over the nation's most troubled school districts
for decades without substantially ameliorating their dismal and
disgraceful performance.'
There can be no doubt that the programs grouped under the
general rubric of the "New Accountability" mark an important shift
in efforts to reform these troubled districts.2 Accountability reforms
operate in the public sphere, implicitly denying the claim that only
markets can solve the problems of failing schools. They rely upon
legislative and executive action, rather than locating the power to
reform troubled schools in judges, who have limited control over
schools' activities, no ongoing experience with education, and a
constrained repertoire of remedies. And instead of regulating topdown, accountability reforms encourage flexibility at the local level
1. See, e.g., FREDERICK M. HESS, REVOLUTION AT THE MARGINS: THE IMPACT OF
COMPETITION ON URBAN SCHOOL SYSTEMS 7-8 (2002) (noting agreement for decades that
"urban school systems are in crisis" but that many reform efforts have "failed to produce the
desired results"); Jennifer L. Hochschild, Three Puzzles in Search of an Answer from Political
Scientists (with Apologies to Pirandello),37 POL. SCI. & POL. 225, 227 (2004) ("Urban school
districts, with occasional exceptions in particular schools or along particular substantive
dimensions, are largely a disaster."). The assertion of disaster holds whether disaster is
defined comparatively, against the standard set by the mass of public schools that serve the
relatively rich and white students of America's suburbs, or by some reasonable aspiration of
what public education ought to be. See CLARENCE N. STONE ET AL., BUILDING CIL CAPACITY:
THE POLITICS OF REFORMING URBAN SCHOOLS 10-11 (2001) (describing how urban schools fail
relative to suburban schools in reading, math, and science, and how they fail to meet the
requirements of the twenty-first century job market).
2. "The New Accountability" is "new" because "accountability [wa]s an 'in' word among
educators" as early as 1972. EDWARD WYNNE, THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY:
PUBLIC INFORMATION ABOUT PUBLIC SCHOOLS, at ix (1972). In 1972, as it does today, the word
had various connotations; Wynne defined it as "systems or arrangements that supply the
general public ... with accurate information about school output performance-test scores and
other data that show how well groups of children are learning in school." Id.
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where educational programs are implemented; they impose
demands regarding outcomes and information sharing but leave
local officials to find the best ways to reach the standards the
programs impose.
This Article argues that accountability programs indeed offer a
new and promising way to catalyze the reform of schools in crisis,
but not by virtue of the features of the programs that have dominated public controversy. The most important innovation through
which the New Accountability addresses the problems of distressed
schools has to date been relegated to the sidelines. Public debate
has focused on the wisdom and validity of testing students to
measure their performance, the risks of regimenting education
across a diversity of schools and modes of inquiry, the proper
measurement of educational improvement, and the educational
legitimacy of setting standards for schools in the first place.3 The
debate has come-implicitly in many cases and explicitly in
some-largely to identify the New Accountability entirely with the
practices of standard-setting, testing, and the dissemination of
information about results.4
3. See, e.g., Eric A. Hanushek & Margaret E. Raymond, Lessons About the Design of State
Accountability Systems, in No CHILD LEFT BEHIND? THE POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF SCHOOL
ACCOUNTABILITY 127, 144-47 (Paul E. Peterson & Martin R. West eds., 2003) [hereinafter No
CHILD LEFT BEHIND?] (describing possible consequences of various testing regimes); Frederick
M. Hess, Refining or Retreating?High-StakesAccountability in the States, in No CHILD LEFT
BEHIND?, supra,at 55, 63-64 (discussing concerns in wealthy districts that accountability will
lower elite standards and misstate elite educational achievement); Teresa Dahmus, The
Effects of the No Child Left Behind Act on the Balance of Power Among Local, State, and
Federal EducationalAuthorities, 16 LBJ J. OF PuB. AFF. 20, 23 (2003) (expressing concerns
regarding the standardization and regimentation of reform mandated in the No Child Left
Behind Act); James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 934-35, 941 (2004) (objecting to measurement of student achievement
based upon "uniform benchmarks"); Jay Mathews, A Swing Away from Recess: Demands of
Education Law Squeeze Out Downtime, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2004, at B1 (reporting the
concerns of parents and educators that accountability programs prompt elimination or
curtailment of recess, field trips, and enrichment).
4. See, e.g., WYNNE, supra note 2, at ix (defining accountability with a focus on testing
and supplying information about results); Diana Rhoten et al., The Conditions and
Characteristics of Assessment and Accountability, in THE NEW ACCOUNTABILITY: HIGH
SCHOOLS AND HIGH-STAKES TESTING 13, 14 (Martin Carnoy et al. eds., 2003) ("Accountability
is the use of ... tests, procedures, methods, or series of tasks to measure what is taught and
learned."); Andrew Rudalevige, No Child Left Behind: Forginga CongressionalCompromise,
in NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND?, supra note 3, at 23, 26-27 (alluding briefly to "[biroader
consequences" for failing districts but concluding that accountability under the No Child Left
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To make such an identification is to miss the reason that
policymakers adopted a banner of "accountability" rather than
simply one of "standards": American schools and school districts are
peculiarly unaccountable institutions. They are insulated from the
consequences of malfeasance by their natural monopoly over policy
implementation, which ultimately must occur in classrooms widely
dispersed and difficult to monitor; they are even more insulated by
the peculiar intergovernmental structure of American education,
which distributes responsibility for schools across two types of
governments-states and school districts.' Although the state is the
locus of constitutional authority over school policy, school districts
enjoy virtually total power over policy implementation. This gives
districts unusual freedom to pursue their own self-interest, which
often diverges from the state's educational agenda.6 District
resistance to externally motivated policy change is the shoal upon
which many previous education reform efforts have foundered. The
fundamental task of accountability is to undermine district power
to resist reform-not so much to define standards as to discover how
to hold schools and school districts to whatever standards are
established.
To do this requires attention above all not to standards but to
sanctions.7 At the intuitive heart of the term "accountability" is that
Behind Act "centers in two areas: in the requirements that must be met in return for federal
money and in creating information that can drive parental demands of, and choice within, the
public schools").
5. Three levels of government participate in education if one considers the relatively
small, but increasingly vital, federal role. See infra Part II.B.
6. See Andrea K. Rorrer, Intersections in Accountability Reform: Complexity, Local
Actors, Legitimacy, andAgendas, in EDUCATIONAL EQUITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY: PARADIGMS,
PoLIcIES, AND POLITIcs 251, 256 (Linda Skrla & James Joseph Scheurich eds., 2004) ("[Ilt is
imperative to consider impending environmental influences on local actor preferences and
their decisions to act. For instance, as schools and districts navigate responsibility for the
education of all children, they must continuously contend with competing values and interests
in what can be contested territory."); GAIL L. SUNDERMAN, IMPLEMENTING A MAJOR
EDUCATIONAL REFORM: No CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS: FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 2 (The Civil Rights Project, Working Paper, 2003), available at http-/fwww.
okea.org/ESEA/actionresources/CivilRightsFederal.pdf(IE| ach level of government typically
has its own priorities .... ").
7. See Hess, supra note 3, at 57 ("[Ilt is important to distinguish between high-stakes
accountability systems that include sanctions for students, teachers, or both and those
nonintrusive standards-based systems that do not.").
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failure should compel consequences. 8 The new accountability
programs the states have adopted do not merely set standards
for districts and schools to meet-they impose punishments for
failure. In order to confront local leaders with genuine incentives to
reform, moreover, these punishments are of a particular kind.
Accountability sanctions are designed to curtail or eliminate local
power. The ultimate sanction is "disestablishment": the school
board and superintendent in a district failing persistently are
unseated, and authority over all school matters reverts to the state.9
Unlike judicial reform decrees or hierarchical diktats from state
education departments, for which less-than-faithful implementation
by a district carries few consequences, or market reforms, where the
consequences of poor performance are attenuated, a disestablishment threat is vivid. Local officials at risk of losing their authority
to manage district affairs have every reason to align their activities
to an extent with state preferences.
The qualification-that states can force district realignment to an
extent-is crucial. Accountability programs and threats of disestablishment do not magically transform districts into states' faithful
agents. Just as numerous districts have resisted judicially-imposed
school reform by taking advantage of the restricted palette and
limited capacity of judicial actors,"0 districts seek to resist stateimposed reform as well. To be sure, districts will be appalled by the
prospect of disestablishment and will undertake a variety of feasible
but ambitious reforms in order to avoid its realization. But districts
also recognize that imposing disestablishment sanctions carries
political, educational, and financial costs for states. States may not
be as enthusiastic about disestablishment as state officials would
like districts to believe. Aware that disestablishment is painful for
states as well as for themselves, districts must assess, rather than
8. See, e.g., Lynn Olson, Shining a Spotlight on Results, EDUC. WK, Jan. 11, 1999, at 8
(noting that, in pursuit of"a very American set of ideas: Take responsibility for your actions.
Focus on results. And reap-or rue-the consequences," education "policymakers are moving
to reward success and punish failure in an effort to ensure that children are getting a good
education"); Amy M. Reichbach, Note, The PowerBehindthe Promise:EnforcingNo ChildLeft
Behind to Improve Education, 45 B.C. L. REV. 667, 674 (2004) (describing how the No Child
Left Behind Act equates "accountability" with "rewarding and sanctioning districts and
schools based on students' academic achievement").
9. See infra Part I.A.
10. See infra Part II.A.
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assume, the credibility of state threats to disestablish them. Unsure
of the magnitude of the costs states face and the weight that states
assign to those costs, such credibility determinations must necessarily be made in an environment characterized by incomplete
information.
That districts must arrive at their own, uncertain conclusions
about states' true intentions does not deprive state threats of the
power to induce reform. Indeed, reform will likely be undertaken in
a wider variety of districts than the state has actually targeted.
Reform, however, will probably fall short of both the demanding
standards of adequacy that states articulate in their accountability
provisions and states' genuine preferences, which themselves are
reflected imperfectly in statutory language. Incomplete information
brings other costs as well: states must find ways to signal their
seriousness about sanctions to districts that have reasons to doubt
them, and it becomes impossible for states and districts to communicate directly and openly to one another what their goals and
preferences are.
These very real costs notwithstanding, the structural limitations of accountability sanctions also work to benefit troubled
public schools. Threats of disestablishment characterized by
incomplete information vastly ameliorate the otherwise overwhelming difficulty faced by standards-based school reform: determining
how high to set the bar. If standards are too low, desirable reforms
go unimplemented; if too high, districts may be sanctioned unfairly
and sometimes give up all effort. External policymakers, however,
lack reliable methods by which to distinguish between standards
that districts and schools cannot achieve-for the woes of urban
education are complex and overwhelming-and those that they will
not achieve-whether from want of incentives, institutional inertia,
lack of creativity, or simply diverging preferences.
Because disestablishment threats allow districts to know the
criteria for disestablishment only imperfectly, however, this
problem is ameliorated substantially. Districts are more apt to try
when there is a reasonable likelihood that some success plus
good-faith effort will forestall sanctions, but are still motivated to
try their best for fear that a lesser effort will yield a disastrous
sanction. States are better positioned to reward the best efforts,
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punish the worst, and galvanize future reform if the criteria they
use are specified imperfectly and known incompletely. On the other
hand, states are also constrained by the need to keep their threats
credible; districts only reform if they are convinced that the risks of
noncompliance are genuine.
Part One of the Article elaborates upon this argument. The
subsequent Part analyzes efforts by two governmental institutions
other than the states to promote school accountability: the courts
and the federal government. Although the New Accountability has
been embraced by both-in the case of the federal government,
embraced with a vengeance-neither is likely to be able to use new
accountability policies with much success, notwithstanding the
conceptual similarities of their efforts to the state programs that
are so promising. Key characteristics of state-district interaction
-the shared incentives of both parties to avoid sanctions and
incomplete information about credibility-are absent when
disestablishment is threatened by judges or by Washington. The
Article first considers judicial efforts to demand accountability,
concluding that the political economy that accountability creates
exacerbates the institutional disadvantages courts already face in
the education reform field. The Article then considers the federal
government, which sought to transform the New Accountability
from a state to a national policy with the No Child Left Behind
Act of 2001. Here again, a close analysis of the Act and its intergovernmental context suggests that accountability decreed from
Washington will be considerably less successful at reforming very
troubled districts than ostensibly similar programs initiated by
states-although Washington may have a role to play in improving
particular deficits in districts where overall performance is already
adequate.

11. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. 112002).
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DETERRENCE, AND SIGNALING

A. School DistrictNonaccountabilityand the Disestablishment
Incentive
The unaccountable school district has long been a feature of
American public education. This is surprising in light of the blackletter principle that states are principals and school districts merely
their agents, 2 empowered solely at the state's convenience and
perpetuated entirely at its pleasure.' 3 Nevertheless, for a variety of
historical, legal, bureaucratic, and political reasons, districts have
enjoyed a long tradition of near-total autonomy.
History plays a large role. Public schools were first founded
locally, with various communities setting up their own provisions
for local schooling. The general principle of state plenary authority
over districts is one of constitutional, not historical, primacy.' 4 The
historical centrality of local districts is at the root of the assumption-still a basic norm in contemporary American political culture
-that public education is properly a local affair. Thus, as localism
of various kinds became an important line of defense for opponents
of integrating public schools, the Supreme Court asserted famously
in Milliken v. Bradley" that "[nlo single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of
12. In the context of education, the "principal-agent" nomenclature of organization theory
is a recipe for ruinously graceless expression at best and utter confusion at worst. At the
school level, teachers are "agents" of the building's "principal"-hence the latter's title. (The
title of course reflects a formal principle less actualized today than previously; collective
bargaining for teachers has often meant that principals lack a "principal's" authority over
teacher-agents.) At the district level, however, school principals (the people) are the "agents"
of the school district, which is the policy-setting "principal."
13. See Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 108 (1967) (extending to regional school
districts the Court's prior description of general local governments as "convenient agencies
for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them,' and
the 'number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon [them] ...
and the territory
over which they shall be exercised rest[ing] in the absolute discretion of the State (quoting
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907))).
14. See David Tyack, Forgotten Players: How Local School Districts Shaped American
Education, in SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND INSTRUCTIONAL RENEWAL 9, 11-20 (Amy M. Hightower
et al. eds., 2002).
15. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the
maintenance of community concern and support for public schools
and to [the] quality of the educational process.""
History and tradition, however, do not fully explain the continuing force of localism. Several structural features of public education
help to assure the continuing vitality of local control. One such
feature flows from the nature of schooling itself: school districts
control policy implementation in ways the state cannot match. As
Jean Madsen notes, "[dlistrict administrators can either impede
or enable educational reform policies to be implemented" in local
schools. 7 Possibilities for effective monitoring, moreover, decrease
exponentially with the distance of the supervisor from school
classrooms and corridors. The principal-agent relationship between
schools and higher levels of government has long been recognized
by scholars of organizations as "loosely coupled." I" This unsupervisable discretion of district officials gives them a measure of power

16. Id. at 741-42. Milliken ignored pointedly the view of school districts that the Court
articulated in Sailors. It seems scarcely controversial to attribute the difference to Sailors'
being a voting-rights case without obvious racial implications, where Milliken asked the Court
to require both suburban and urban school districts to participate in remedies for
metropolitan school segregation. In the face of that demand, Milliken treated individual school
districts as independent entities that, although themselves duty-bound to avoid racial
discrimination, had no duty to remedy the racist practices of other districts. Richard Briffault
usefully calls this Milliken view of local governments-that their existence is a received
tradition rather than the result of government action-"pregovernmental." Richard Briffault,
Our Localism: PartIl-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 387 (1990). This
attitude pervades state as well as federal jurisprudence about education. But see Sheff v.
O'Neil, 678 A.2d 1267, 1288 (Conn. 1996) (placing the onus on state government to provide
equality in educational opportunity); James E. Ryan, Sheig Segregation,and School Finance
Litigation,74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529, 544 (1999) (discussing Sheff and localism).
17. JEAN MADSEN, EDUCATIONAL REFORM AT THE STATE LEVEL: THE POLITICS AND
PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION 141 (1994); see also JAMES P. SPILLANE, STANDARDS
DEVIATION: How SCHOOLS MISUNDERSTAND EDUCATION POLICY 4 (2004).
18. JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 158 (1984); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES Do AND WHY THEY Do IT 224 (1989). Indeed, Hochschild and Wilson locate the
largest measure of discretion with classroom teachers themselves; when a teacher closes the
classroom door, teaching and learning by their nature become difficult to observe. District
authorities, however, appear to be sufficiently local to monitor teachers effectively and exert
significant policy control over their work. See Mary Bushnell, Teachers in the Schoolhouse
Panopticon: Complicity and Resistence, 35 EDUC. & URB. SOC'Y 251, 259-61 (2003)
(documenting techniques for monitoring teacher compliance with curricular and pedagogical
standards); id. at 264 ("A teacher's work is inherently public ....").
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over state officials that the state cannot decree away. 9 Indeed, as
states become more ambitious in the range of educational mandates
they impose upon districts and in the policy initiatives they sponsor,
the very scope and diversity of state ambition expands district
discretion and makes state monitoring even more difficult.2"
Further complicating the connection between high-level
policymaking and on-the-ground implementation are the fuzzy
specifications of good teaching. Good educational practice is
sufficiently complex to defy the regulator's toolbox of prescription
and regulation.2 ' A state seeking to impose a reform agenda
hierarchically-say, by issuing regulations that govern teacher
practice-would need to alter the practices of a large number of
teachers "over whom it has little, if any, direct control and to whom
it has no proximity," and to "try[] to make this change in a profession where good practice is nearly impossible to clearly specify."2 2 In
short, although we sometimes know good teaching when we see it,
we do not understand it well enough to describe-much less
mandate-its components. Remote command-and-control regulation
fails both because monitoring is unavoidably imperfect and because
the regulations themselves cannot be well specified.
School districts' political advantages are as important as their
bureaucratic ones. Like many other governmental institutions,
school districts have political constituencies committed to their
survival and their continued autonomy. The most prominent such
constituency for school districts is suburban parents and suburban
voters.2" Suburbanites, whose school districts are insulated from the
19. See James P. Spillane, School Districts Matter: Local EducationalAuthorities and
StateInstructionalPolicy, 10EDUC. POL'Y 63,77 (1996) ("[Clompliance with state policy ... did
not mean relinquishing [school administrators'] instructional policy-making functions. If
anything, compliance meant making more district policy.").
20. See David K Cohen, Policy and Organization: The Impact of State and Federal
EducationalPolicy on School Governance, 52 HARV. EDUC. REv. 474, 477 (1982); Spillane,
supra note 19, at 65.
21. David Glenn, No Classroom Left Unstudied, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 28, 2004
(quoting Robert E. Stake, Professor of Education at the University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign, for the view that idiosyncratic and nonreplicable variables determine educational
outcomes).
22. SUSAN FoLLETr Lusi, THE ROLE OF STATE DEPARTMENTS OF EDUCATION IN COMPLEX
SCHOOL REFORM 10-11 (1997).
23. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 12
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poverty and other bedeviling problems of urban education by
geography and by decisions like Milliken,2 4 have every incentive to
keep the borders of their districts closed to outside interference.
They resist entanglement not only with other districts2 5 but also
with the state. Even childless suburbanites are keenly aware that
the quality of their local school districts is capitalized into their
property values and, therefore, as a general matter, prefer to keep
power over district affairs as localized as possible.
It is less commonly recognized that suburbanites devoted to the
autonomy of their school districts have counterparts in distressed
urban and rural districts. In these places, constituencies support
school district autonomy not because of a perceived need to defend
quality or exclusiveness against outside encroachment, but in order
to protect the professional and economic interests of local elites.
Scholars first noted such interests in the late 1960s and early
1970s, when political scientists and sociologists began to gather
case study data on large urban school systems. These early
researchers' agenda was twofold: first, to explode the then-prevalent
myth that school government was somehow separate from, or above,
politics; and second, working with Dahlian models of pluralism
and interest-group models of local politics, to determine the extent
to which school government offered an example of grassroots
American democracy.26 One of their earliest observations was the
enormous potential for interest-group capture of the school board,
especially by appointed superintendents and their professional
staffs.2 7 Scholars even documented cases of superintendents who
(2001) (asserting that homeowners' "[cioncern about the vulnerability of their largest asset"
spurs special attention to public school affairs); DOUGLAS REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 128 (2001); James E. Ryan &
Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2046 (2002)
("When suburbanites perceive a threat to their schools, they fight back, and they usually
win.").
24. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
25. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 23, at 2057 (describing current opposition to
interdistrict busing in Connecticut); id. at 2060 (discussing opposition of local citizens to the
attempted economic equalization of school districts brought about by capping local
expenditures on schools or recapturing local revenues and distributing them among other
school districts within the state).
26. See, e.g., L. HARMON ZEIGLER ET AL., GOVERNING AMERICAN SCHOOLS: POLITICAL
INTERACTION IN LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS 1-22, 95-118 (1974).
27. Samuel B. Bacharach, OrganizationalandPoliticalDimensionsforResearch
on School
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were able to shape permanently the membership of the school
boards that employed them by influencing the boards' electoral
politics.2"
A variety of reasons were adduced to account for professional
capture. The research emphasized in particular the nonpartisan
nature of school board politics: absent political parties, no institutions existed around which opposing viewpoints or expertise could
be organized.2" This led to heavily consensus-based governance. 0 In
addition, part-time board members were relatively ignorant
about educational issues and impressed easily by the professional
status of their educator-employees. Educators, and the education
schools that trained them, encouraged this susceptibility. Educators
saw that they could obtain and hold power, notwithstanding the
democratic form of American education, by "'sanctifying' the
position of the educational professional[ ."3 A haze composed of
equal parts inviolability, professionalism, and complexity surrounded educational practice, exacerbating the already grave
principal-agent problems that lay school boards faced in supervising
the professionals they hired to run their systems. 2
Though the ability of school professionals to cow their lay
employers with a mythos of disinterested professional expertise has
waned since the 1960s,3 3 the constellation of interest groups that
influence school districts remains structured to confer systematic
advantage upon professional and other employees. Clarence Stone
and others describe contemporary "employment regime[s]" that
dominate school district policy choices.' This concept draws upon
District Governance and Administration, in ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN SCHOOLS AND
SCHOOL DISTRICTS 3, 6 (Samuel B. Bacharach ed., 1981).
28. LAURENCE IANNACCONE & FRANK W. LUTZ, POLITICS, POWER AND POLICY: THE
GOVERNING OF LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS 23-24 (1970).
29. See id. at 22-23.
30. See id. at 27.
31. JOHN THOMAS THOMPSON, POLICYMAKING IN AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION: A
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 77 (1976).
32. See id. at 82 ("Schools have adapted to conflict between professionals and lay groups
... by defining certain decisions as being in the professional sphere and thus to be made only
in the bureaucratic system. Th[is] technique Dha[s] largely enabled educators to control both
their own concerns and those of their students.").
33. See id.
34. Clarence N. Stone, Introduction:Urban Educationin PoliticalContext, in CHANGING
URBAN EDUCATION 1, 9 (Clarence N. Stone ed., 1998).
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Stone's earlier elaboration of a regime model of business dominance in urban governance. In his pathmarking study of Atlanta
politics, Stone defines a "regime" as an "informal yet relatively
stable group with access to institutionalresources that enable it to
have a sustained role in making governing decisions."3 5 The
business regimes that Stone observed with these characteristicsinformality, stability, and access to resources-were able to exert
sustained influence, though not necessarily hegemonic power, in
multiple policy areas. The "city's major business enterprises control
too many vital resources, organizational as well as economic, to be
excluded" from policymaking; thus, policy is skewed toward their
interests, "work [ing] against any tendency for nonbusiness interests
to come together and challenge the governing role of business
elites." 6 Stone's point in using the phrase "regime" is to suggest
that the system is systematically skewed, although not absolutely
dominated, by the regime's agenda. Policies that serve regime
interests are consistently, but not invariably, adopted.
Stone's application of this theory to school districts is edifying.
Just as urban governance is skewed towards business and its
interests, Stone argues, school governance is animated similarly by
the goals of preserving contracts and especially jobs in the school
system, creating an "employment regime."" As Stone and others
point out, 8 the public school system is a vital source of jobs and
35. CLARENCE N. STONE, REGIME POLITICS: GOVERNING ATLANTA, 1946-1988, at 4 (1989).
36. See id. at 231-32.
37. See Stone, supra note 34, at 8-10.
38. Scholars other than Stone have discerned the fingerprints of employment regimes
without using his terminology. They emphasize school boards' focus upon the employment and
career needs of administrators and employees to the frequent detriment of academic and other
educational needs of broader constituencies. Jeffrey Henig and his colleagues note "long
traditions of bureaucratic autonomy and norms of professionalism that between them can
create an institutional and ideological buffer zone that holds private actors at arm's length."
JEFFREY R. HENIG ET AL., THE COLOR OF SCHOOL REFORM: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE
CHALLENGE OF URBAN EDUCATION 17 (1999). Wilbur Rich characterizes the school boards in
three large cities with black mayors as "cartel-like" organizations, "co-opt[ed]" by white
educational establishments, and selected in elections "biased toward incumbents, unionbacked candidates, and middle-class professionals." WILBUR C. RICH, BLACK MAYORS AND
SCHOOL POLITICS: THE FAILURE OF REFORM IN DETROIT, GARY, AND NEWARK 5,207-08 (1996).
Stone identifies Rich's analysis as consistent with his own employment regime approach. See
Stone, supra note 34, at 9; see also Charles Mahtesian, Whose Schools?, GOVERNING, Sept.
1997, at 34, 37 (describing the Jersey City and Newark school districts as "well-lubricated
employment agenc[ies]"); Derek W. Meinecke & David W. Adamany, School Reform in Detroit
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other "immediate benefits."3 9 Some poor school districts are the
biggest employers in town. 40 As Wilbur Rich puts it: "Schools are
one of the major linchpins of the urban economy.... School districts
have big budgets, hiring thousands of local residents and purchasdistricts generate
ing a variety of products and services.... 4School
1
millions of dollars for the local economy."
The size and immediacy of the economic benefits schools offer
their workers, Stone argues, provides a ready principle around
which school politics can be organized and maintained.4 ' Those
interested in such benefits, moreover, have stability and resources.
The superintendent and her professional staff, whose ability to
capture the lay leadership has already been noted, are by training,
temperament, and background often friendly to the interests of
teachers.4'Employees' (particularly teachers') unions and contractors are themselves the premier organized interest groups. They
want schools run for their benefit and their cooperation is vital to
the smooth running of the educational enterprise. Teachers' unions
also control a large bloc of voters who will turn out even in lowsalience school board elections. Unions-a paradigmatic example of
the geographically dispersed interest group-enjoy particular
political advantages because they can organize effectively at both
the state and district levels. 44
Other interest groups also have a stake in education and play a
role in district politics: local businesses, interested both in overall
business climate and in employing school graduates; taxpayers;
and PublicAct 10: A Decisive Legislative Effort with an UncertainOutcome, 47 WAYNE L. REV.
9, 11-12 (2001) (claiming that the Detroit school board "drained Detroit Public Schools
allowed itself to be influenced by outside entities when making 'hiring,
resources [and] ...
purchasing and other operating decisions'); Charles Strum, Trenton Names Auditor to Rule
Newark Schools, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1993, at B1 (quoting Dr. Elena Scambio, an assistant
education commissioner, as stating"'Newark is ajobs market disguised as a school system'").
39. See Stone, supra note 34, at 10.
40. See JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD & NATHAN SCOVRONICK, THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 20 & n.29 (2003); PATRICIA FRY ET AL.,

KENTUCKY'S PROGRAM FOR

EDUCATIONALLY DEFICIENT SCHOOL DIsTRICTS: A CASE STUDY 15 (Consortium for Policy
Research in Educ., No. TC-005, 1992).
41. RICH, supra note 38, at 4-5.
42. See Stone, supra note 34, at 10.
43. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
44. See Terry M. Moe, Politics, Control, and the Future of Social Accountability, in No
CHILD LEFT BEHIND?, supra note 3, at 80, 92-93; STONE, supra note 35, at 138-39.
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parent-teacher associations; schools of higher education and
universities; and national interest groups with local branches, such
as the NAACP and veterans' organizations.4 5 Interest groups have
particular room to maneuver in educational politics because
political parties, which offer a partial alternative to interest-groupbased political organization, 46 are absent in nonpartisan school
districts. Interest group power has also grown at the expense of
superintendent autonomy. As early as 1972, Frederick Wirt and
Michael Kirst quoted a "former big-city superintendent" expressing
a "commonly held view":
It used to be that a school superintendent, if he was at all
successful, would have the feeling that he had the ability to
mount a program and carry it through successfully. I think at
the present time very few superintendents would be able to say
honestly that they have this feeling. They are at the beck and
call of every pressure that is brought to them. They have lost
initiative.47
None of these groups, nevertheless, can muster the sustained
focus and resources required to compete with the employment
regime. As Stone notes, the school-related "concerns of parents and
other stakeholders tend to be highly fragmented."4 8 Parents are the
preeminent losers, because they would reap the most direct benefits
from replacing employment concerns with academic achievement
as the primary goal of school districts. Parental interests in
achievement, however, are not structured in ways that permit
effective influence upon district policy. 49 First, as Terry Moe reports,
"[pleople who are low in education and expectations, many of them
located in low-performing districts, are more satisfied with their
schools" than average American parents, who themselves typically
45. See EDGAR L. MORPHET ET AL., EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION:

CONCEPTS, PRACTICES, AND ISSUES 157 (4th ed. 1982).
46. DAVID R. BERMAN, STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS 114-15 (9th ed. 2000).
47. FREDRICK M. WIRT & MICHAEL W. KIRST, THE POLITICAL WEB OF AMERICAN SCHOOLS

86-87 (1972).
48. See Stone, supra note 34, at 12.
49. See STONE, supra note 35, at 82-83, 86 (detailing obstacles to parental effectiveness
including educators "largely inattentive" to parental participation and only "sporadic"
parental involvement in controversial or personal issues).
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report satisfaction with the public education provided to their
children.5" Parents lack direct control over school funding and
generally do not vote in district elections. 5 ' For even moderately
dissatisfied parents, moreover, exit is often a more attractive option
than voice. Rather than organizing their peers, they can, if they
have the financial means, move either to the private school system
or to a different school district.5 2 All of these factors keep employment concerns ascendant.
The practice of local educational autonomy is thus sustained from
many sources. It is based upon districts' bureaucratic power to
guide policy implementation, a power that ultimately derives from
the loose coupling of teachers and their supervisors. It is buttressed
by political constituencies with very strong reasons to resist outside
influence. And it is protected by a long historical tradition that has
come to enjoy substantial legal deference. All these factors make
localism resilient in the face of reform.
In light of localism's strengths, nonlocal actors seeking educational reform perforce must attend to "accountability." Some way
has to be found not only to specify how schools might change for the
better but to make sure that schools do in fact change.
The strategy that is perhaps the most obvious-cash rewards
for good district performance-is, alas, full of pitfalls. Although
rewards for top performers are in use, they relate only marginally
to the problems that accountability must address. Districts whose
performance is poor or very poor will perceive accurately that they
have little chance of receiving rewards and therefore are unaffected
by them.53 Employment regimes in such districts, moreover, may
recognize that the magnitude of performance bonuses falls far below
the cost to regime interests of obtaining them. In addition, rewards
to high-performing districts have the collateral effect of exacerbating interdistrict inequities, as more successful schools, likely to be

50. See TERRY M. MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND THE AMERICAN PuBLiC 345-46 (2001).
51. See IANNACCONE & LUTZ, supra note 28, at 22.
52. See STONE, supra note 35, at 40 (describing the "ability of middle-income parents to
practice the exit option" and remove a child from a given school jurisdiction).
53. See Hanushek & Raymond, supra note 3, at 139 (noting that schools are not affected
equally by incentives; "schools that have scores close to a threshold might be expected to alter
their behavior more than schools further away from the established critical threshold").
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richer given the correlation of wealth with achievement, are made
richer still.54
The converse of cash rewards for the best performers is reductions in state or federal aid for the worst. Recasting prizes as fines
has the advantage of focusing the incentive on the sector with the
biggest problems. Withholding aid is a sanction that can get the
attention of poorly performing districts and the regimes that
control them. In many ways, however, prizes and fines have similar
drawbacks. Like rewards, financial penalties exacerbate inequity.
In addition, an ideal accountability sanction penalizes the deficient
providers of education but still helps, or at least does not harm,
victimized students who are unwilling and innocent recipients of an
abysmal education. Financial sanctions do just the opposite, by
withdrawing resources from students whose schools perform the
least well while leaving regime interests substantially intact.5 5
These practical and theoretical limitations of cash incentives
helped buttress arguments for educational privatization, choice, and
other market-based reforms. In their famous brief for educational
markets, John Chubb and Terry Moe claim poor school management is "inherent" in "institutions of democratic control." 6 No
matter what bureaucratic incentives (like prizes and fines) are
applied, Chubb and Moe argue, schools subject to popular government will bow to constituencies with interests other than the
education of children. Bureaucracy responds only to the interestgroup incentives of bureaucratic politics; attention to noneducational criteria is "deeply anchored in the most fundamental

54. The effect of rewards is further muddied in those states where the highest courts have
mandated school finance equalization to support exclusively the most distressed public
schools. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, 408 (N.J. 1990) (requiring that
.poorer urban districts' educational funding [be made] substantially equal to that of propertyrich districts," while ignoring equity for districts in between). If both the worst and best are
rewarded, only the mediocre middle remains uncompensated.
55. Cash sanctions for underperformance are particularly difficult to maintain in an
environment where courts require subsidies for underperforming districts. See Abbott 11, 575
A.2d at 408-11. But subsidies, while focusing resources upon the neediest students, create
incentives for districts that could not be more perverse. As more states experiment with
funding equalization, moreover, the view that additional resources do not systematically
translate into performance gains empirical support. See infra note 228.
56. JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 188
(1990).
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properties of the system." 7 For Chubb, Moe, their allies, and even
some who retain some doubts about choice, the only way to privilege
educational goals in public schools is to substitute market-based
mechanisms for top-down district management, so that educators
who do not respond to consumer needs lose their customers and
their jobs.58
Educational privatization has not become the juggernaut for
which its proponents hoped in the early 1990s. The only way to
provide genuine market alternatives to urban public schooling in
the short term was to include religious schools in a voucher system;
consequently, early choice plans operated under a constitutional
cloud that may have rendered potential sister efforts stillborn.59
Although the Supreme Court has now held that religious and
nonreligious private schools alike may accept publicly issued
educational vouchers, ° constitutional doubt persists at the state
level, 6 and, more important, it has become clear that the programs
are quite unpopular. Suburbanites, whose political power has
already been noted,6 3 never backed the idea. As a group they like
their public schools as they are, and are also sufficiently perspica57. Id.

58. See id. at 33; see also Paul E. Peterson, School Choice:A Report Card,in LEARNING
FROM SCHOOL CHOICE 3, 7-23 (Paul E. Peterson & Brian C. Hassel eds., 1998). But see
JEFFREY R. HENIG, RETHINKING SCHOOL CHOICE: LIMITS OF THE MARKET METAPHOR 20-25,
188-95 (1994).

59. Cf Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,656 n.4 (2002) ("[A] principal barrier to
entry of new private schools is the uncertainty caused by protracted litigation which has
plagued the program since its inception.").
60. Id. at 662-63.
61. See Toby J. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State Constitutions,86 VA. L. REV. 117,
123-24 (2000).
62. See, e.g., STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 161 (claiming that voucher proposals have
"[w]ith very few exceptions ... encountered deep resistance"); Jennifer Hochschild, Rethinking
Accountability Politics,in NO CHILD LEFr BEHIND?, supra note 3, at 107, 108 (2003) ("The only
proposed reform that has, so far, mostly met defeat in a hostile political environment is
vouchers for use by public school students in school districts outside their own or in private
or parochial schools."); Ryan & Heise, supra note 23, at 2079 ("More voucher plans have been
rejected than passed.... Every proposal to provide vouchers on a large scale has failed.
Between 1990 and 1993 alone, for example, fourteen state legislatures considered and
ultimately rejected voucher proposals."). But see Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v.
Board of Education." EconomicIntegrationof the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1376
(2004) ("Scathingly rejected in Griffin v. County School Board, the voucher program is now,
after decades of relentless writing and speaking by its supporters, popular public policy.").
63. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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cious to recognize ways in which widespread adoption of voucher
programs might threaten their ability to exclude urban students
from their schools.6 4
Although there was no privatization revolution, its advocates'
exposition of the inadequate incentives that face school professionals penetrated discourse about public education. One of its successes was somewhat ironic: representatives of the public education
establishment, where choice is anathema, sometimes sounded much
like the privatizers in touting school-based decision making and
radical decentralization as solutions to America's educational woes
because decentralization would displace bureaucrats. 6' Theodore
Sizer, for example, associates "state governments becom[ing] more
involved in the regulation of the schools"
with "hierarchical
6
bureaucracy finally run totally amok."
So, too, the focus on incentives influenced the development of
accountability programs. States "becom[ing] more involved in the
regulation of the schools,"67 insistent that local school districts rise
to meet new state standards for academic achievement, were newly
interested in making sure that proper incentives for such performance were in place. State policymakers thus endorsed the
privatizers' view that good incentives were critical.6 8 At the same
64. The Cleveland voucher program upheld in Zelman permitted, but did not require,
public schools in suburban districts abutting Cleveland to accept voucher students. See
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 707 & n.17 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[Plublic schools in adjacent districts
hardly have a financial incentive to participate in the Ohio voucher program, and none has
[chosen to do so.]"). Given suburban interests, this policy was hardly a surprise. That voucher
programs in the future might constrain risk-averse suburbanites' preference for exclusion,
however, was nevertheless easy to contemplate. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 23, at 2082
("The possibility that school choice might introduce a substantial number of urban students
into suburban schools ... makes choice threatening to many suburban parents and
homeowners alike.").
65. See Janet M. Ferguson & Paul Nochelski S.J., The Power of Letting Go, AM. SCH. BD.
J., Apr. 1996, at 37; Starita Smith, School by School, AM. SCH. BOARD J., June 1998, at 22.
66. THEODORE R. SIZER, HORACE'S COMPROMISE: THE DILEMMA OF THE AMERICAN HIGH

SCHOOL 206 (1984).
67. Id.
68. Some of the initial rhetoric surrounding the provisions described in this paragraph
suggests a certain innocence with regard to deterrence. Some proponents of disestablishment
appeared to believe, or at least thought it wise to articulate for public consumption, that its
purpose was simply to improve failing school districts by replacing their incompetent
managers with able ones. This version of disestablishment takes it as simply a policy of
"substitute administration," which states continue to apply to floundering local governments
in a variety of substantive areas. CHARLES M. KNEIER, CITY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED
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time, policymakers rejected the conclusion that such incentives
were unique to markets and impossible to create within a public
system. Nor did they abandon hierarchy. Instead, recognizing that
control could not be asserted effectively by issuing top-down
directives, and that cash awards and penalties were likely to be
both ineffective and counterproductive, states have turned to a
third possibility. They include in their accountability programs a
provision that a district that fails to perform can be disestablished,
its local officials deprived of power and its affairs made the
responsibility of the state department of education.6 9 Although state
STATES 130-31 (3d ed. 1957); see also David R. Berman, Takeovers of Local Government: An
Overview and Evaluation ofState Policies,PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, Summer 1995, at 55, 5760 (describing the nature of takeover policies); Vincent L. Marando & Mavis Mann Reeves,
State Responsiveness and Local Government Reorganization,69 Soc. Sci. Q. 996, 997, 1002-03
(1988). Thomas Guskey argues along these lines that states adopted the term "academic
bankruptcy" to describe failing schools and school districts in an explicit effort to analogize
distressed school districts with bankrupt corporations. Thomas R. Guskey, Policy Issues and
Options When States Take over Local School Districts,2 INTL. J. EDUC. REFORM, Jan. 1993,
at 68, 69. Just as the court appoints a receiver when private management fails, in order to
uphold a firm's economic obligations, the state removes local management incapable of
meeting the requirement to provide adequate education. See id. at 69; see also Ronald T.
Hyman, State-OperatedLocal School Districtsin New Jersey, 96 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 915,
919-20 (1995). Even if disestablishment was not conceived initially as a policy of deterrence,
however, the incentives it creates quickly became central to the policy's operation. See
Berman, supra, at 67 (noting that New Jersey state officials "have discovered that the mere
threat of takeover can sometimes get the attention of local school officials and galvanize them
into taking corrective action without further state involvement"); SUSAN H. FUHRMAN &
RICHARD F. ELMORE, TAKEOVER AND DEREGULATION: WORKING MODELS OF NEW STATE AND
LOCAL REGULATORY RELATIONSHIPS 27 (Consortium for Policy Research in Educ., No. RR-024,
1992) (noting the possibility of deterrence).
69. See ALA. CODE § 16-6B-3(c)-(d) (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-15-430 (Michie 1999); CAL.
EDUc. CODE § 52055.5 (West Supp. 2004); COL. REV. STAT. § 22-7-609 (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 229.0535 (West 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-14-41 (2001); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/23.25f (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-3.14-5 (West 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 256.11 (West
2003); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 158.780, 158.785 (Michie 2001); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 4-303
(2001); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 13A, § 01.04.07 (2004); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 69, §§ I-1K (Law.
Co-op. 2002); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 603, § 203 (2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1280
(West 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-17-6 (1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 160.538 (West 2000); N.J.

STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-15 to -16, 18A:7A-29 to -34 (West 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-2W
(Michie 1978); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 100.2(p) (2004); 1995 N.Y. LAWS ch. 145;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-105.39 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3302.01-3302.08,
3316.01-3316.20, 3311.71-3311.77 (West 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1210.541 (West
2003); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6-692 (West 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-7.1-5 (2001); S.C.
CODEANN. § 59-18-1520 (Law. Co-op. 2004); TENN. CODEANN. §49-1-602(C) (2002); TEX. EDUC.
CODE ANN. § 39.131 (Vernon 1996); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2E-5 (Michie 2003); W. VA. CODE
ST. R. § 126-13-3 (2004).
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criteria for displacing district governments vary, 70 as do the
procedures for dealing with districts once disestablished, 7 ' the
incentive structure remains the same-the leadership of a district
can be required to step aside when a state identifies it as inadequate and unwilling or unable to implement, with state help, an
effective reform program.
This application of deterrence to public education marks a
genuine shift in approach. It punishes local officials directly, rather
than their budgets; therefore, it avoids harming students already

70. The state codes set out various criteria that, if unmet, qualify districts as potential
disestablishment targets. These criteria are usually objective, incorporating measures such
as test scores, attendance, and dropout rates. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-6B-3(c) (2001) (defining
districts "in need of assistance," which are ultimately subject to state administration, in terms
of student performance on standardized tests); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 52050.5-52056.5 (West
Supp. 2004) (specifying an "Academic Performance Index" for the measurement of academic
performance that includes specified standardized test scores, attendance rates, and
graduation rates); COL. REV. STAT. § 22-7-604 (2003) (requiring the assignment of a percentilebased "academic performance grade" of A, B, C, D, or F, to each public school, based on
student performance on subject tests); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 229.57 (West 2001) (assigning school
districts grades of A through F on the basis of standardized test scores, the "degree of
measured learning gains of the students," attendance and dropout rates, disciplinary
statistics, "student readiness for college," and other performance data selected by the state
Board); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-2-281, 20-14-30, 20-14-80 (2001) (identifying under-performing
schools on the basis of student performance on tests in reading, language, mathematics
(grades 1-8), science and social studies (grades 3-8), participation in and scores on various
high school tests, dropout rates, attendance rates, school completion rates, and any other
indicator the board feels appropriate); 703 KY. ADMIN. REGs. 3:205 § 1(1) (1999) (specifying
a state review of instructional data in first-stage assessments); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §
39.051 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999) (allowing for performance evaluation to include dropout and
attendance rates as well as test scores). In Iowa, the criteria include subjective as well as
objective measures. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 256.11(10) (West 1996).
71. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-6B-3(c)-3(d) (2001) (requiring the state superintendent to
"assume the direct management and day-to-day operation of the local board of education");
ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-20-1609 (Michie 1999) (allowing for a variety of steps including: waiver
of most provisions of Arkansas law as they apply to the district; appointment of a state
superintendent responsible to the state; transfer of all the powers and duties of the local
school board to the state department of education; disestablishment of the school board and
allowance for the local administration to proceed without board supervision; re-empowerment
of a former board; calling of new board elections; and annexation of the district to a
neighboring district); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1210.541 (West 2003) (permitting state
intervention through a variety of methods that include providing funds and technical
assistance, but may also include reassignment of district personnel, transfer of students,
operation of the school by personnel employed by the state department of education,
mandatory annexation of all or part of the local school district, and placing operation of the
school with an institution of higher learning).
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victimized by abysmal schooling.
Indeed, disestablishment
sanctions harness the very deficiency of public educational systems
that the privatizers identified, namely a preoccupation with
interest-group machinations and political power at the expense of
educational goals. 73 Local officials who are willing to sacrifice
excellence for political expediency are precisely the kind of officials
unwilling to sacrifice their own jobs. The view that elected officials
make policy choices in order to preserve their tenure and power is
now commonplace in political science. In the context of school
districts that are run as employment regimes, the assumption
seems particularly strong. Regime interests can be served only if
friendly district officials preserve their power. Patrons' interests are
best served by maintaining such officials in power, even if those
officials must be less than fully responsive if they are to keep their
jobs.75 By making effective practices the price of power, states can
induce the regime to shift in the service of effectiveness.
Although disestablishment creates a realistic incentive for
inducing school districts to reform, the resulting changes are not
straightforward. As will be seen, states cannot simply announce a
minimum level of district performance and in so doing compel
successfully all districts to achieve that level.76 Instead, disestablishment threats deter district malfeasance to some extent. The
nature and magnitude of change depend on the capabilities and
preferences of both states and districts. To these the analysis now
turns.

72. See supra note 58.
73. See supra notes 29-52 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 7 (1990) ("I
assume that when legislators have to make a decision they first ask which alternative
contributes more to their chances for reelection. If they see a significant difference, they
choose the alternative which better serves that cause."); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building
Government in ConstitutionalLaw, 118 HARV. L. REV. 916, 929 & n.41 (2005).
75. Any doubt that disestablishment is inimical to regime interests should be put to rest
by cases like that of Detroit, where one of the earliest acts of the mayorally appointed and
state-backed superintendent who replaced the elected school board was to persuade the
Michigan legislature to remove the union protections of principals and other school
administrators. See Meinecke & Adamany, supra note 38, at 45-47.
76. See infra Part I.D. (describing the effect of incomplete information on the efficacy of
reforms).
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B. DistrictResponsiveness to Incentive Systems
Troubled school districts, almost by definition, do not implement
the kinds of educational improvements that states want. The
previous section argued that states nevertheless can move districts
in the direction of reform by threatening disestablishment. This
implies that the status quo ante in troubled districts is in some
sense voluntary, that districts set their policies and choose to alter
them in response to threats. This preliminary claim requires
justification. Some recent scholarship on educational change
challenges this assumption in two opposite ways: by arguing that
poorly performing districts will not respond to incentives at all and
by arguing that threats are unnecessary to induce school district
reform."
Begin with arguments that school districts will not respond
rationally to genuine incentives that states place before them.
School districts are, like other governmental bureaucracies, complex
organizations.7" Their behavior is driven not by the rational
calculation of a single interest but by the competing efforts and
interests of various officials and groups.7 9 Troubled school districts,
moreover, are often described as dysfunctional organizations,
unable to act effectively in their own interests. On either account,
districts are institutionally incapable of responding rationally to
disestablishment threats.
A line of educational scholarship stretching over several decades
supports the position that school districts are an unnecessary
layer of bureaucracy interposed between states and schools that
lack influence, capacity, and interest in educational goals and are

77. To say that district choices are voluntary is to say that districts can be made
accountable-they can be forced to alter their behavior by others. The claims that districts
cannot change if they want to (on the one hand) or that they would change eagerly if only
shown the way (on the other) are thus essentially rejections of the concept of accountability
itself: the one argues that districts cannot be made accountable, and the other that they need
not be.
78. See STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 145 ("[T]he bureaucratic resistance paradigm
presumes that we already have a good idea what needs to be done, but that self-interested
education professionals, wielding disproportionate power, scuttle or emasculate any efforts
that interfere with their comfortable routines."); id. at 145-47.
79. See SARAH F. LIEBSCHUrZ, BARGAINING UNDER FEDERALISM: CONTEMPORARY NEW
YORK 9 (1991).
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therefore irrelevant to education reform.8" This position was
popularized during the enthusiasm for site-based management,
which sought to cut districts out of school governance entirely. A
recent review concludes:
Until recently, education reform movements have paid little
attention to school districts. State and federal policies have
concentrated on schools as central units of change, rendering
local districts virtual nonactors in the educational improvement
process.... Critics claim that districts play no significant role, are
inconsistent with sound policy, and are inefficient bureaucratic
institutions."'
The weight of contemporary evidence, however, is that school
districts are able to respond rationally to changing circumstances
that affect their interests. Caroline Hoxby demonstrates econometrically that public school districts respond to variation in
levels of competition from the private-school sector, a basic threat
to their interests. s2 School districts in areas where competition for
students is greater invest more in teachers and other educational
resources and produce higher student performance. "[C]ompetition
among public schools," Hoxby reports, "appears to increase productivity in such a way that costs are reduced while student perfor80. See, e.g., KATHRYN A. MCDERMOTT, CONTROLLING PUBLIC EDUCATION: LOCALiSM
VERSUS EQUITY 121-22 (1999) (concluding that school districts are an anti-egalitarian
makeweight interposed between states and individual schools and should be abolished).
81. Julie A. Marsh, How DistrictsRelate to States, Schools, and Communities:A Review
of Emerging Literature, in SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND INSTRUCTIONAL RENEWAL 25 (Amy M.
Hightower et al. eds., 2002) (citations omitted).
82. See CAROLINE MINTER HOxBY, DOES COMPETITION AMONG PUBLIC SCHOOLS BENEFIT
STUDENTS AND TAXPAYERS?, at 13-23 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
4979, 1994) [hereinafter HOxBY, DOES COMPETITION AMONG PUBLIC SCHOOLS BENEFIT
STUDENTS AND TAXPAYERS?]. Because increasing private-school enrollment does not
immediately result in pro rata reduction in public-school budgets, private competition may
in fact offer short-term fiscal benefits to public schools even as it poses a long-term threat. In
later work, Hoxby argues that the primary "short to medium term" mechanism by which
private school competition affects public school expenditure and productivity is not school
district responsiveness to competitive threats but changes to the tax base brought about by
different resident preferences that are capitalized into property values. With regard to the
long term, however, she maintains that school districts do react to competition for students
and political support. See Caroline Minter Hoxby, The Effects of Private School Vouchers on
Schools and Students, in HOLDING SCHOOLS ACCOUNTABLE: PEFORMANCE-BASED REFORM IN
EDUCATION 177, 180-81 (Helen F. Ladd ed., 1996).
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mance is improved."' Separate studies by John Bohte and Eric
Rofes conclude similarly that school districts respond when charter
schools begin to compete with them for students."4 Bohte, analyzing
data from Texas generated between 1997 and 2001, finds that
competition from charters results in small but significant performance gains in traditional public schools." Rofes conducted twentyfive comparative case studies of school districts to assess their
responses to the establishment of charter schools in their regions.
He reports that "[a] lmost one-quarter of the districts studied (24%)"
reacted energetically to the advent of charter schools by altering
significantly their educational programs.' Most of the districts in
the Rofes sample did not respond to charters "with swift, dramatic
improvements" at the time of the study, but instead went "about
business as usual, responding to charters slowly and modestly.""7
This group of slow responders included most, but not all, of the
large, urban districts in the sample. Thus, a substantial fraction of
districts in the Rofes sample not only had the capacity, but felt the
need to undertake at least some reform in response to charter
schools, though that response was in many cases small in scale.
That the responses were not more vigorous is explained straightforwardly by a relatively small perceived threat rather than by a low
capacity to respond.
Recent research that identifies the capacity of districts to catalyze
instructional improvement in response to accountability programs
imposed by the states is more directly relevant to disestablishment
incentives. Julie Marsh reviews a number of studies that suggest
that districts have the capacity to interact productively with states
above and schools below.8 8 John Sipple and his colleagues report
83. See HOXBY, DOES COMPETITION AMONG PUBLIC SCHOOLS BENEFIT STUDENTS AND
TAXPAYERS?, supra note 82, at 25.
84. See John Bohte, Examining the Impact of Charter Schools on Performance in
TraditionalPublic Schools, 32 POLY STUD. J. 501, 515 (2004); Eric Rofes, The CatalystRole
of CharterSchools, SCH. ADMIN., Aug. 1999, at 14.
85. Bohte, supra note 84, at 515.
86. Rofes, supra note 84, at 16; see also Frederick Hess et al., Small Districts in Big
Trouble: How FourArizona School Systems Responded to CharterCompetition, 103 TCHRS.
C. REC. 1102, 1107 & n.2., 1108-09, 1111-12 (2001) (documenting both policy change and the
replacement of district superintendents and school principals in response to competition from
charter schools in four small school districts).
87. Rofes, supra note 84, at 16.
88. See Marsh, supra note 81.
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that the imposition by the New York State Board of Regents of
stricter standards backed by a testing regimen "clearly stimulated
aggregate change in local districts outcomes.""9 Patricia Burch
catalogues several studies that document ways in which district
policies both shape and are shaped by "school-level agendas."9 °
Richard Elmore and Susan Fuhrman report that districts have
responded "constructively" to state accountability policies by, inter
alia, improving their evaluation, professional development, and
curricular capacities to serve schools at risk of state sanctions. 9 H.
Dickson Corbett and Bruce Wilson find that districts in two states
adapted to state accountability programs that required schools to
publish the results of high-stakes student testing.9 2 Using a twostate comparative case study design, they argue that districts,
perceiving increasingly high stakes associated with standardized
tests, changed curricula to meet the testing standards.9 3 Indeed, for
Corbett and Wilson, "[tihe policy challenge is to encourage local
attention to reform without instigating counterproductive responses." 4 When districts perceived sufficient pressure associated
with the tests, they began to supplement their initial reforms with
counterproductive ones, "teaching to the test" in ways disruptive to
broader educational goals and programs.9 " James Spillane, who
conducted two case studies of Michigan districts responding to a
state initiative that sought to impose particular instructional
policies, also argues forcefully that districts respond to state

89. John W. Sipple et al., Adoption and Adaptation: School District Responses to State
Imposed Learningand GraduationRequirements, 26 EDUC. EVALUATION & POLY ANALYSIS
143, 161 (2004).
90. Patricia Ellen Burch, Constraints and Opportunities in Changing Policy
Environments:IntermediaryOrganizations'Responseto Complex DistrictContexts, in SCHOOL
DISTRICTS AND INSTRUCTIONAL RENEWAL, supra note 81, at 111.
91. Richard F. Elmore & Susan H. Fuhrman, HoldingSchools Accountable:Is It Working?,
83 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 67, 70 (2001).
92. H. Dickson Corbett & Bruce Wilson, Raising the Stakes in Statewide Mandatory
Minimum Competency Testing, in THE POLITICS OF REFORMING SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION: THE
1988 YEARBOOK OF THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 27, 29-36 (Jane Hannaway &
Robert Crowson eds., 1989).
93. See id.
94. Id. at 27.
95. Id. at 36-37 ("Mhe indicator of performance becomes the goal itself.").
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programs but that in doing so they sometimes undermine, rather
than advance, state goals.96
That some districts can respond, however, does not imply that all
districts can respond. Some of the research demonstrating the
ability of districts to respond to outside threats preserves the caveat
that not every district has the capacity to respond effectively.9 7 On
this view, overwhelming crisis and pervasive dysfunction combine
to prevent particularly troubled districts-the sort that make likely
disestablishment targets-from reforming themselves in relevant
ways. Elmore goes so far as to make a rational-choice argument
about distressed schools, one that he would surely apply to distressed districts as well: "Low-performing schools aren't coherent
enough to respond to external demands for accountability.... Lowperforming schools, and the people who work in them, don't know
what to do. If they did, they would be doing it already.""
The weight of the evidence, however, is that this view is too
pessimistic. As Jeffrey Henig and his colleagues argue, "[t ] o be sure,
[distressed urban] school districts face daunting problems and
limited resources. Nevertheless, there is a significant capacity for
local action given the autonomy of local educational actors;
moreover, each district operates with a substantial budgetary
base."9 9 Henig's conclusion that even very troubled school districts
have the capacity to act in their own interests finds additional
support from Frederick Hess's recent work on the ways in which
school districts respond to voucher programs. °° Hess relies on case
studies of three districts-Cleveland, Milwaukee, and Edgewood,
Texas-all of which are highly distressed (and one of which,
Cleveland, has been disestablished).' 0 ' He finds that the competitive
pressure posed by voucher programs induced in districts a "limp
response" that fell short of systematic change in educational
practices. 1 2 Hess documents some "generally mild" changes at the
margins, often produced by giving entrepreneurial employees
96. See SPILLANE, supra note 17, at 168-70; Spillane, supra note 19, at 77-83.
97. See, e.g., Elmore & Fuhrman, supra note 91, at 70.
98. Richard F. Elmore, Testing Trap, HARV. MAG., Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 37; see also
SUNDERMAN, supra note 6, at 10.
99. HENIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 64.
100. See HESS, supra note 1, at 217-18.
101. See id. at 18-19.
102. Id. at 197.
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within the districts somewhat more latitude to innovate. 0 3 In
Milwaukee, where the most change occurred, Hess concludes that
"competition had shown significant signs of chipping away at the
barriers to entrepreneurship."" ° Hess also shows that the Milwaukee and Cleveland districts, where the voucher programs were
government-supported rather than private, devoted a great deal of
energy to undermining the voucher program politically, rather than
improving their own services.0 5
Hess, like Rofes, reports that troubled districts do respond to
external threats but that their responses are weak. 06 Hess,
however, argues convincingly that severely distressed districts have
the ability to respond to external threats, rejecting Elmore's view
that districts' attenuated, "limp" responses should be attributed to
lack of capacity. Although districts "are heavily burdened by balky
structures, executives lacking effective tools, and a culture that
insulates educators," Hess argues, "these constraints ... can be

relaxed by policymakers or may evolve with time."0 7 He emphasizes
that the weakness of district reactions may be due to the fact that
"competition depends largely on producers reacting to anticipated
-not just existent-threat," offering educators "insulation from
sanctions" that encourages inaction.' 8 The threat of disestablishment, of course, is far more immediate than that posed by competition.
Both Rofes and Hess also note that district responses have some
variance. Rofes, for example, emphasizes the importance of
leadership in distinguishing districts that change substantially in
response to charters from those that change only marginally.' 9 This
suggests that some troubled districts have reform capacity, and that
capacity is related to a factor under school districts' control. Finally,
Hess's interpretation of his own data has too constrained a definition of response. It is eminently rational for a threatened district to
103. Id. at 217.
104. Id. at 135.
105. See id. at 52, 203-05 (arguing that "[wihen faced with a significant threat, [urban
school officials] are likely to concentrate on mobilizing popular sentiment or on taking
marginal actions that will allay the concerns of vocal constituencies").
106. See id.
107. Id. at 17.
108. Id. at 199.
109. See Rofes, supra note 84, at 16-17.
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respond with political activity designed to relax or undermine state
demands."'
Finally, it should be emphasized that the claim that troubled
school districts have the capacity for reform does not imply that
they have the capacity to produce instantaneous, precisely targeted,
or brilliantly conceived reforms. School districts' problems are not
susceptible to easy solutions. For deterrence to be relevant,
however, districts need only be able to perceive a threat and try to
respond to it reasonably. That sort of capacity does appear to inhere
even in troubled districts, and such capacity ought to be sufficient
to permit districts to respond effectively to disestablishment
threats. Disestablishment is preceded by an escalating set of state
interventions, the timetable for which is lengthy by design and even
further elongated in practice. Districts subject to disestablishment
receive early warnings, and disestablishment is preceded by a
probationary period during which technical assistance is available
from the state. Districts, required to develop remedial plans jointly
with the state, can shape-though not determine-the nature of the
reform program that will be imposed."' In addition, what will
110. Cf infra notes 154-62 and accompanying text (describing political resistance to federal
accountability mandates).
111. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-6B-3(c)-(d) (2001) (allowing for a probationary period of three
years to develop and implement an improvement plan); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52053 (West Supp.
2004) (allocating $50,000 to each participating school to be used to create an action plan
during the three- to four-year probationary period); COL. REV. STAT. § 22-7-609 (2003)
(allowing a one- to two-year probationary period during which the district must create a
'school improvement plan" using local discretion, subject to state suggestions); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-14-41(a) (2001) (mandating a state audit for any school with a grade of D or F on either
the absolute or within-school improvement scale, resulting in the recommendation of various
levels of state intervention including public notice, public hearings, and ordering "the
preparation of an intensive student achievement improvement plan" to be approved by the
state); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/2-3.25d (West 1998) (requiring a state-approved School
Improvement Plan for each school on the watch list, with measurable goals and timetables
during the two-year probationary period); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 69, § 1J (Law. Co-op. 2002)
(establishing a probationary period of at least thirty months, during which the district must
develop and implement a remedial plan for improvement); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 160.538 (West
2000) (creating a probationary period of two years, during which the school may be required
to develop new plans for personnel recruitment and retention and be subject to the monitoring
of a "school accountability council"); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 100.2(m) (2003)
(requiring a probationary period of three years for the superintendent to prepare and
implement a corrective action plan in cooperation with the school and the state); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 49-1-602(c) (2002) (requiring school districts to create a school improvement plan based
on the state study conducted during the first year of the three-year probationary period).
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satisfy the state depends, among other things, on the difficulty of
the problem. Even small reforms well within the reach of troubled
school districts may satisfy states." 2 Districts are often not
disestablished unless and until their inadequacies transcend the
dramatic to approach the farcical."' Partial reform of these
problems surely seems within the reach of troubled districts.
Quite unlike those who deny the capacity of districts to reform," 4
other scholars suggest that external prodding is unnecessary to
induce them to do so. Instead, these scholars suggest, even troubled
districts are ready partners for reform, willing to respond to a
state's agenda not because their parochial interests are threatened
but because they perceive a genuine and respectful partner who can
help them resolve an educational crisis that, they concede, they
cannot tackle on their own." 5 All that is needed on this version is
the right sort of intergovernmental institutions to channel districts'
willing spirit effectively.
The most prominent expositors of this view are James Liebman
and Charles Sabel, who argue that public education is undergoing
a "vast and promising reform""' based upon a model of intergovernmental problem solving that they and their colleagues have
elsewhere described as "democratic experimentalism."" 7 Liebman
112. See infra Part I.C.
113. In districts that have been subjected to disestablishment sanctions, abysmal test
scores and spiraling debt have typically been only a backdrop for more spectacular
shortcomings. Compton (CA), Baltimore (MD), and Allendale (SC) were the lowest-ranked
districts in their respective states when they were disestablished. See Karen Diegmueller,
Academic Deficiences Force Takeover of Calif District, EDUC. WK., Sept. 16, 1992, at 21
(Compton); Alan Richard, Starting from Scratch, EDUC. WK, Oct. 13, 1999, at 30, 32
(Allendale); Jessica L. Sandham, Despite Takeover Laws, States Moving Cautiously on
Interventions,EDUC. WK., Apr. 14, 1999, at 21 (Baltimore). Jonathan Kozol, in his jeremiad
for American urban education, describes a school system in East St. Louis, Illinois, that leaves
children "poisoned in their bodies and disfigured in their spirits." JONATHAN KoZOL, SAVAGE
INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHooLS 39 (1991). He cites labs with no running
water, bathrooms that are nonfunctional and putrid, and a class called "Introductory Home
Ec." supervised by a teacher who explains "that students do no work on Friday, which, she
says, is 'clean-up day." Id. at 27-36. Similar accounts abound.
114. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 116-31 and accompanying text.
116. James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public LaboratoryDewey Barely Imagined:
The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 183, 184 (2003).
117. See generally Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (examining a "new form of government" in
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and Sabel, associating experimentalism with 'The New Accountability,""' describe the latter as follows:
The core architectural principle of the emergent system is the
grant by higher-level authorities-federal government, states,
and school districts-to lower level ones of autonomy to pursue
the broad goal of improving education. In return, the local
entities-schools, districts, and states-provide the higher ones
with detailed information about their goals, how they intend to
pursue them, and how their performance measures against their
expectations." 9
These elements-intergovernmental goal setting, local autonomy
regarding methods, feedback, and benchmarking-have, Liebman
and Sabel argue, already borne fruit in troubled schools that had
long resisted reform.1 20
Liebman and Sabel are perceptive observers of the educational
scene, and have helpfully identified many aspects of educationreform politics missed by others, especially in their penetrating
analysis of the limitations of court-instigated reforms. 1 and their
identification of "the district as a key actor in reform.""22 Puzzling,
however, is the experimentalists' broad assumption that districts
and states share not only "the broad goal of improving education,"
but that they are also jointly committed to a common high-level
understanding of what it means to improve education.'2 3 For the
experimentalists, the only question is how best to improve. To be
sure, the experimentalists argue that improvement is not and
which power is decentralized, but in which governmental bodies help coordinate information
sharing); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1015 (2004) (characterizing experimentalism as a
system based upon negotiation, performance measures, and transparency).
118. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 116, at 229.
119. Id. at 184. But see Terry M. Moe, Politics, Control, and the Future of School
Accountability,in No CHILD LEFT BEHIND?, supra note 3, at 80, 81 ("The movement for school
accountability is essentially a movement for more effective top-down control of the schools.").
120. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 116, at 184; cf. Sabel & Simon, supra note 117, at
1020 (discussing "[d]estabilization rights," which are "claims to unsettle and open up public
institutions that have chronically failed to meet their obligations and that are substantially
insulated from the normal processes of political accountability").
121. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 116, at 192-207.
122. Id. at 244.
123. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
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should not be a concept defined precisely; under their model,
states adopt standards sufficiently ambiguous to allow local
experimentation and input and must make room for local variation.
Experimentalism assumes, however, that improving academic
achievement is everyone's primary desideratum. 2 4 This is not at all
clear in school districts that are governed by employment regimes.
Similarly, experimentalism posits an intergovernmental agreement
to avoid prior commitments about means: whichever tactics the
processes of experimentation, feedback, and benchmarking identify
as effective should be retained, and whichever fail should be
discarded.'25 This is even less plausible, as it requires states and
districts to distinguish between goals and means similarly and to
have no extrapedagogical commitments to techniques. Regime
theory suggests that, to the contrary, the conceptual frameworks
applied by local policy actors to the task of reform will be ones that
continue to privilege employment goals.
Put differently, policies seen as instrumental by the state are
goals from the perspective of districts. Employment is a means to
the educational end for education reformers, but education is a
means to the employment end for the district regime. No collaborative process, with or without feedback, should be expected to bridge
that chasm.
Although Liebman and Sabel acknowledge the potential'for state
and district interests to diverge'2 6 and also emphasize the role of
broad dissemination of performance information in checking district
behavior,'2 7 these observations cannot cure an account that, as
Liebman and Sabel recognize, "reeks of utopianism."' 2 The primary
utopianism of the experimentalist case is not, however, one to which
Liebman and Sabel demur.'2 9 Experimentalists do acknowledge that
124. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 116, at 184.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 272 ("[1It would be foolhardy to think that the reformed professionals, while
reviling the hierarchies built by their Progressive ancestors, have no selfish or shortsighted
interests themselves .... ").
127. See id. at 290.
128. James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The FederalNo Child Left Behind Act and the
Post-DesegregationCivil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1703, 1715 (2003).
129. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 116, at 191 ("Some readers may suspect that the
disentrenchment of interests and other transformations ... magically suspend iron laws of
politics and the fundamental limits of collective action."); id. at 232 (arguing that the
experimentalist account explains "what in the light of standard theories appear to be
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their account involves the suspension of principles of inertia and
resistance to change associated ordinarily with public bureaucracies. They argue, however, that the extraordinary emergency faced
in some public school districts induces desperation, which motivates
officials to shed the ordinary baggage of self-interest and turf to
embrace cooperation and innovation. 3 ° They fail to acknowledge,
however, that in many ways the leadership of failing school districts
may be well served by unreformed practices. It is not realistic to
expect desperation to turn school district regimes against their
fundamental interests, especially in highly distressed districts
where union and patronage concerns may dominate the local
agenda.13
Liebman and Sabel document several case studies where they
argue systems of feedback, benchmarking, and state/district
cooperation have produced promising results." 2 That districts have
responded to state standards, worked with state officials, and
experimented with various reform strategies does not, however,
imply either their agreement with state goals or a commitment to
experimentalist process. This Article argues that a reform-oriented
improbable, even impossible, outcomes").
130. See id. at 267 ("Robbed of any public legitimacy, entrenched interests are exposed as
only self-seeking and can be pushed aside by diffuse coalitions that can claim substantial
resources for reform projects in the name of the public good."). This contention has some
support in the work on civic capacity and education reform performed by Clarence Stone and
his colleagues. See generally MARION ORR, BLACK SOCIAL CAPITAL: THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL
REFORM IN BALTIMORE, 1986-1998, at 113-19 (1999); CLARENCE N. STONE ET AL., supra note
1, at 12-13; Stone, supra note 34, at 9. Stone and his colleagues define "civic capacity" as "the
mobilization of varied stakeholders in support of a communitywide cause" of educational
improvement in ways that transcend ordinary interest group politics. See Stone, supra note
34, at 15. In Stone's view, civic capacity is a vital ingredient of successful school reform, and
its development is possible, though often stymied by conflicting group interests, especially
identity differences centering upon race and the urban/suburban divide.
131. See Hochschild, supranote 62, at 116 ("[BJy mandating standards with accountability,
elected officials of all political stripes and at all levels of government have eschewed
deniability, narrowed their maneuvering room, and offended a powerful interest group-all
for the sake of tackling a contentious and perhaps intractable problem. Why"); see also
Jennifer L. Hochschild, Comments on James S. Liebman and Charles F. Sabel, A Public
Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 327, 327 (2003)
("[Niationwide systemic school reform as described by Liebman and Sabel should not have
occurred, according to conventional political wisdom. By the same logic, the further reforms
they predict and hope for are unlikely to transpire.").
132. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 116, at 231-66. But see id. at 268 ("lhese campaigns,
of course, sometimes fail. In Alabama and Ohio, for example, they have been checked by the
established interests ....").
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process of local experimentation and learning can arise as easily
in response to conventional power politics as from a collective
intergovernmental commitment to suspend political self-interest.
Districts may conform to state preferences not out of agreement or
consensus but out of fear in order to preserve their own interests. 3 3
A corollary of that conclusion is that the experimental process
should not be expected to yield continuous improvements over time,
as the experimentalist account appears to suggest. Districts may
seek to do as little as possible, rather than improve continually, in
meeting accountability standards. Where partial or halfhearted
reform appears to the experimentalist as a failure of creativity or
institutional organization, this Article recognizes in it a district
effort to preserve regime interests in the face of state demands.
To be sure, neither Elmore's axiom of complete failure of district
capacity,' the experimentalist assumption of shared understanding in the face of crisis, 13 nor the assumption of rationalist
maximization of regime interests 136 applies across the board. Each
account offers a valuable perspective. Nevertheless, in seeking to
understand education reform it seems more prudent to explain the
133. Proponents of the experimentalist paradigm might also argue that the assumption
that districts prefer the status quo to reform is so stylized as to be blind to the obvious desire
of failing schools to improve. And, of course, distressed districts do seek improvement. State
and district goals do not ineluctably diverge. Numerous district officials, principals, and
teachers regularly demonstrate their commitment to offering students their best efforts.
Indeed, it is this commitment that leads Elmore to conclude, "[11ow-performing schools, and
the people who work in them, don't know what to do. If they did, they would be doing it
already." See Elmore, supra note 98, at 37. Elmore's conclusion that reform fails because of
lack of local capacity dovetails with the experimentalist view that districts embrace states'
goals of educational improvement. Liebman and Sabel, however, properly characterize this
passage as an example of undue pessimism about the "limited capacities of states and
schools." Liebman & Sabel, supra note 116, at 291. This rejoinder to Elmore makes vivid their
common assumption, shared with Stone and his colleagues, that the central problems are ones
of capacity.
Elmore, the experimentalists, and this Article fall along a continuum of positions regarding
district goals and district competence. Elmore and the experimentalists agree that reform
goals are common to states and districts. They disagree whether distressed districts have the
capacity to reform: Elmore thinks not, but the experimentalists argue that a process of local
experimentation and feedback can both realize and refine reform goals. This Article agrees
with the experimentalists that local innovation can produce effective reform but rejects the
initial assumption of shared goals.
134. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
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data, including the cases of relatively successful reform, as consistent with the parties' political needs than to assume the suspension
of the pursuit of self-interest. The balance of this Article proceeds
in that vein, by assuming that school districts have some capacity
to undertake reforms desired by the state and a preference not to
do so. This preference is driven by local interests in reelection,
patronage, employment, and power, which are either allowed
explicitly to trump policy concerns or, more likely, systematically to
color local understanding of what constitutes desirable educational
practice.
The preceding two sections have established that self-interested
district officials should seek to moderate their most egregious
practices in order to avoid forestalling the immeasurably worse
outcome of losing control over the district, and that they have the
capacity to move toward that goal. Their calculus is simple: stripped
of their powers and jobs, district leadership can reap no benefits
from their unreformed practices. The advantages associated with
running a reformed district may be fewer than those associated
with running an unreformed district, but they are still better for
district officials than powerlessness and unemployment. Better to
undertake reform in response to disestablishment threats, thus at
least retaining (partial) control over the schools, (perhaps reduced)
access to school resources, and their official positions.
That this account remains too simple is made clear by one piece
of empirical data: nearly all states that have disestablishment
sanctions on the books have invoked them at least once. 137 If
districts are both anxious to avoid sanctions and capable of reform,
why have so many districts been taken over? Clearly, the effects of
the disestablishment sanction are more complex than simple
deterrence. The next two sections offer a model of that complexity.

137. The best compilation of state takeovers records the disestablishment of some fifty
districts, spread over twenty states, since 1989. TODD ZIEBARTH, POLICY BRIEF: STATE
TAKEOVERS AND RECONSTITUTIONS (Educ. Comm'n of the States, 1998), at http://www.ecs.
org/clearinghouse/13/59/1359.pdf (last updated Apr. 2002).
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C. State Incentives and Capacity
Where disestablishment is the worst possible outcome for
districts, it is undesirable, but not overwhelmingly so, for states.
States prefer to avoid it, but not at any cost.
On the one hand, imposing a disestablishment sanction is quite
unattractive to states. Lacking the administrative capacity to
manage schools directly on any scale, states must create such
capacity for any district they plan to take over directly or identify
a third party willing and able to take on the burden. 138 It is
especially surprising that a state would seek out such a burden
when the political tradition of localism and the presence of elected
local school boards insulate states from political accountability
for educational failure. 3 9 States may reasonably expect some
policy change to result from the actual management of the schools
by the state or its designee rather than by ousted district officials,
but these could be realized by local as much as by state reform
if districts could be induced to improve their own performance.
Clear-sighted states should not expect that they or their agents
could do much better than willing districts could do themselves. 4 °
Particularly in recent years, aware of the mixed experience of
early state takeovers like that of Jersey City in 1989,1" state
138. See, e.g., Robert A. Dentler, Ambiguities in State-Local Relations, 16 EDUC. & URB.
SOC'Y 145, 162 (1984).
139. See Hochschild, supra note 131, at 329:
[Glovernors ... built institutional mechanisms and cultivated public expectations
(e.g., of schools as the province of nonpartisan professionals) to insulate
themselves from responsibility for the outcomes of schooling. That makes very
good political sense: politicians who must face reelection almost always seek to
avoid measures that will provide strict and clear accountability for the results
of complex and only partially controllable social processes ....
140. See Levinson, supra note 74, at 928 (stating that government officials "will often find
that their preferred policies can be more effectively implemented by a different government
institution.... They will prefer to defer to some 'competing' institution .... ").
141. See generally SUSAN H. FUHRMAN & RICHARD F. ELMORE, TAKEOVER AND
DEREGULATION: WORKING MODELS OF NEW STATE AND LOCAL REGULATORY RELATIONSHIPS 14-

18 (1992) (reporting little substantive change in the wake of the Jersey City takeover); Kevin
Bushweller, Under the Shadow of the State, 185 AM. SCH. BOARD J. 16, 16-19 (1998)
(suggesting some, but insufficient, progress in Jersey City); Andy Newman, Jersey City
Schools Improve, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1996, at B1 (same); Michael David Rettig, Policy
Adaptation and Change: The Case of the State Takeover of the Jersey City, New Jersey Public
Schools (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (reporting little
substantive change in the wake of the Jersey City takeover).
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officials must worry that to disestablish is to wade into a
quagmire.42 Indeed, lacking the community roots of local officials,
state appointees may be less effective school managers than local

officials.14 3 A taking-over state confronts the same students,
physical plant, community environment, and, in a few cases,
teaching and administrative staff that confronted the district.'"
States other than the very earliest adopters should be quite
skeptical that state-appointed managers can open hitherto unex-

plored vistas of educational achievement and organizational
competence in distressed schools.'4 5
There are also political costs and benefits to disestablishing a
district, some of which are roughly orthogonal to educational
improvement. By disestablishing a district, states not only accept
direct responsibility for its performance but likely alienate
important swaths of the electorate.' 46 These include, most obviously, the leaders of disestablished districts, satisfied or riskaverse parents in those districts, and politicians responsible to
those constituencies. Protest, lawsuit, and political opposition are
reasonably certain concomitants of disestablishment. 4' Suburban
142. See supra note 113 (describing the conditions that state officials face following
disestablishment).
143. See Berman, supra note 68, at 70 ("[Tlhere is little reason to believe that state
administrators can do a better job than local administrators with regards to education
achievement ....").

144. See Richard J. Carson, Perceptions of Educational and Political Leaders of the
Creation of a State Operated School District in New Jersey 62-63 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Temple University) (on file with author); Moe, supra note 119, at 89 ("States can
intervene ... but they may know less about running the schools than local employees do ....");

Rettig, supra note 141, at 288-92 (quoting a Jersey City teacher saying: -'Itwill take the state
fifteen years to figure out this city. Jersey City is going to be the state's Vietnam because they
don't even know who the Viet Cong are.").
145. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 68; Richard C. Hunter & Jeff Swann, School Takeovers
and EnhancedAnswerability, 31 EDUC. & URB. Socy 238 (1999); Charles Mahtesian, Whose
Schools?, GOVERNING, Sept. 1997, at 34, 38; Lynn Olson, Veterans of State Takeover Battles

Tell a CautionaryTale, EDUC. WE., Feb. 12, 1997, at 25.
146. See Levinson, supra note 74, at 935 ("With jurisdiction comes responsibility and
blame.").
147. See, e.g., ORR, supra note 130, at 168-70 (noting a "firestorm" of local protest follows
state involvement in Baltimore schools); Ex-Schools ChiefDenied Job, EDUC. WE., Dec. 10,
1997, at 4 (discussing the lawsuit to block a school takeover in Mississippi); Robert C.
Johnston, Justice Dept. Investigates Takeover of Calif District,EDUC. WK., Mar. 26, 1997, at
18 (discussing a lawsuit to block a school takeover in Compton, California); Charles E. Strum,
Newark School Officials Remain Opposed to State Takeover, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1993, at B5
(noting protest in Newark, New Jersey).
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parents and politicians may also resist, seeing in disestablishment
a crack in the wall of local control that protects them and their
interests even if they themselves are not at immediate risk. Joining
them will almost certainly be the teachers' unions, as accountability
programs in general, and disestablishment in particular, threaten
teacher tenure and work rules.14 8 Union opposition to disestablishment manifests on a statewide, rather than a districtwide, basis,
even if only a handful of districts are at risk. Perhaps the most
dramatic example of such opposition was seen in New Jersey, where
accountability legislation that included a disestablishment sanction
nearly failed due to the opposition of the New Jersey Education
Association, " [t] he most active special interest group."'4 9 The union's
support, and the legislation's passage, was secured not only by a
dramatic concession-that state-appointed officials could not
replace or reassign teachers-but also by the insertion of statutory
language that strongly limited state-appointed superintendents'
ability to remove tenured principals.' 50 In other states, of course,
teachers and principals alike are at risk when districts are disestablished. 15 '
At the same time, disestablishment offers states some benefits.
Most obviously, it gives state officials power over funds, contracts,
and jobs-the same power and control that motivate local officials
to resist disestablishment and to frustrate other sorts of educational
reform.' 52 As noted above, a lot of money is involved.5 3 Electoral
realpolitik can also play a role. For example, the support of the
Democratic (and term-limited) leader of the California state
assembly for a 2003 state takeover of the Oakland schools was
attributed to his desire to decimate the political base of the
president of the Oakland school board, his likely opponent in a

148. See Hess, supranote 3, at 61-62 (describing potential teacher opposition); supra note
75 (discussing removal of union protection for principals and administrators in Detroit).
149. Carson, supra note 144, at 62.
150. See id. at 62-64.
151. See, e.g., supra note 75.
152. Oakland (CA) Mayor Jerry Brown, asked whether his efforts to gain additional control
over the Oakland school system following a possible disestablishment constituted a "naked
power grab," responded, "[m ] ost people in politics prefer more power to less power." Lolis Eric
Elie, Oakland's Mayor Is Still in Orbit, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 14, 1999, at B1.
153. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
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future Oakland mayoral race.154 More systematically, Republican
governors with suburban constituencies may see advantage in
assaulting educational mismanagement in Democratic cities and
may be comparatively more willing to offend teachers' unions.15 5
Similar considerations apply to another motivation commonly cited
in communities where schools are disestablished: racist preferences
on the part of state officials.5 6 The claim that disestablishment is
a colonialist policy informed by racist motives is often heard.'57
154. See Robert Gammon, 600 Turn Out in Support of Chaconas,OAKLAND TRIB., Jan. 19,
2003.
155. See Margaret Dolan-Dabrowski, A Case Study of the First Year of State Control of the
Jersey City Public Schools 12-14 (1992) (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Rutgers Graduate
School of Education).
156. See Beth Reinhard, Racial Issues Cloud State Takeovers, EDUC. WK., Jan. 14, 1998,
at 1.
157. See, e.g., Moore v. Detroit Sch. Reform Bd., 293 F.3d 352, 369 (6th Cir. 2002). The
plaintiffs in Moore, seeking to strike down a law authorizing disestablishment in Detroit,
complained of "disrespectful treatment" of Detroit representatives during legislative debates
and objected to the legislature's refusal to hold hearings in Detroit. See also, e.g., HENIG ET
AL., supra note 38, at 270 (quoting an African American opponent of Maryland's increasing
role in Baltimore schools as stating- "You want to know how [the state's involvement] comes
across? It comes across as racist. The undercurrent I see is, These black people can't learn,
so why spend money on them?'); Tamara Henry, School Takeovers: Officials and Activists
Collide, USA TODAY, Mar. 30, 1999, at 10D (quoting a Detroit activist as stating that
disestablishment is "apartheid legislation"); Psyche Pascual, State Appointee Takes over
Compton Schools, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1993, at Al (quoting Amen Raah, member of the
disestablished Compton School Board, as stating that state education officials are "coming in
[toCompton] with the attitude of a slave master, and the slave master never takes advice
from a slave"); Reinhard, supra note 156, at 18 (quoting Rev. Michael DeBose, a Cleveland
activist, as stating, "When you've got black people in charge and a majority-black district,
people think they don't know what they're doing.).
The heat evident in these comments should surprise no one. Disestablishment has
especially high stakes in districts with a majority black population and black leadership
because it entails the loss of control not just over schools but over one of the central and most
symbolic institutions of black political power. See Stone, supra note 34, at 262 ("For African
Americans ...
public education occupies a central place symbolically, as a policy area closely
associated with the expansion of opportunity."). A disestablishment threat in such a
community becomes racially fraught simply by virtue of the big loss that it imposes. See
HENIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 267. It is even more fraught because it expresses the failure
to realize high hopes that black control of school boards would herald a more locally aware,
child- and community-oriented, and reformist brand of school politics. See id. at 4-6.
This picture may be different in school districts with Latino majorities. See James
Sterngold, In a Largely Latino City, 2 Governments Emerge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2002, at A10
(describing a complex relationship between the city council and school board in a city with a
growing Latino population). See generally Rodney Hero & Susan E. Clarke, Latinos, Blacks,
and Multiethnic Politics in Denver, in RACIAL POLITICS IN AMERICAN CITIES 309 (Rufus
Browning et al. eds., 3d ed. 2003). More research on Latino school politics is needed. A full

1694

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1655

Race, as well as political partisanship, may motivate state politicians to challenge local control in particular districts-and bear the
associated costs--even if officials have no expectation that doing so
will improve education.
Perhaps most enticing to states, however, is that disestablishment offers a way to stimulate educational change in distressed
districts without interfering with the localism of its relatively more
affluent districts. Suburbanites who enjoy good schools protect that
localism vigilantly. 5 ' They oppose interference with local taxing
and spending, not only for the real limitations they would impose
upon educational services, but for symbolic reasons perhaps at least
as potent. As Douglas Reed argues, "efforts to widen educational
opportunities to low-income areas are seen as dangerously threatening to the interests of middle- and upper-middle-class students and
parents."'5 9 For example, school finance reform proposals, by
requiring substantial spending increases and/or equalization in
school funding across rich and poor districts, affect the educational
interests of the relatively rich directly. 6 ° The concomitant political
untenability of finance reform has forced its advocates to seek it
in the courts rather than the legislature.1"' By arguing that the
problems of distressed schools are about management rather than
money, and by simultaneously demonstrating that they are taking
serious and drastic action to root out educational mismanagement
where it exists, states can respond to a mandate to attack educational deficiencies without reslicing the politically sacrosanct
school-budget pie or interfering with suburban prerogatives.'62 For
treatment of the racial dimensions of disestablishment is beyond the scope of this Article.
158. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
159. See REED, supra note 23, at xv.
160. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 23, at 2060.
161. See Thomas Corcoran & Nathan Scovronick, More than Equal: New Jersey's Quality
EducationAct, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQUITY: CREATING PRODUCTIVE SCHOOLS IN AJUST

SOCIETY 70-83 (Marilyn J. Gittell ed., 1998); James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School
FinanceReform, 98 MICH. L. REv. 432,458-63 (1999). But see David J. Hoff, Voters Weigh K-12
Finance at Ballot Box, EDUC. WIC, Oct. 20, 2004, at 1 (indicating voter support as well as

opposition to initiatives to increase school funding).
162. Dyson finds an earlier version of this argument "arguable" and "contradict[ory]." See
Aaron Saiger, Note, DisestablishingLocal School Districts as a Remedy for Educational
Inadequacy, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1830, 1854 (1999) ("Because ... intervention in troubled
districts leaves most other districts unaffected-a characteristic emphatically not shared by
financial or substantive remedies-potential political fallout is mitigated .... "). Dyson doubts
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state-elected officials, a plausible remedial package that is both
revenue-neutral and preserves the status quo in most suburban
school districts is a Holy Grail.
In a nutshell, then, what do states want? Recognizing possible
exceptions to this account that can arise from the idiosyncracies of
local school politics, it seems fair to generalize as follows. Above all,
states would like to see reform. The courts mandate it, the electorate desires it, their political needs compel it. If disestablishment
appears to be the only way to get that reform, states will impose it,
but they do so aware that the reform gains of doing so may well be
small. For this reason, and in order to avoid the political and
financial problems disestablishment brings, states prefer strongly
to avoid disestablishment if local reform can somehow be secured.
This, however, brings us back to the initial puzzle: why so many
disestablishments, when districts have every reason to offer states
reform in order to maintain their own power? These incentives seem
to be a recipe for a world without disestablishment. The next
section seeks to capture that intuition in a model of state and local
interaction that can also explain where the intuition goes wrong.
In doing so, it identifies many of the important features of the
disestablishment sanction.
D. A Two-Player Model of Deterrence
School districts and states are complex institutions with vast and
varied motivations; their interactions are correspondingly complex.
Even if states and districts always followed simple strategies-and
they do not-the behavior of the resulting system might be
unpredictable.'6 3 This insight has been applied to the "complex

whether disestablishment would "mitigate rather than exacerbate political fallout in minority
neighborhoods where poor performing schools typically operate," and claims that 'for some
minority communities there is likely to be great political fallout." Maurice R. Dyson, A
Covenant Broken: The Crisis of EducationalRemedy for New York City's FailingSchools, 44
How. L.J. 107, 182 (2000). Dyson here confuses local and state incentives. The "fallout" he

describes is local, confined to the affected community; the political consequence states are
keen to avoid, by contrast, is objection from the mass of relatively prosperous, suburban
districts seeking to preserve their local prerogatives.
163. See ROBERT JERVIS, SYSTEM EFFECTs: COMPLEXITY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE 7
(1997).
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intergovernmental system" of education by several scholars'" who
characterize intergovernmental educational policymaking as
an "ecology of [local] games" that are largely separate, but do
interact and provide inputs to each intergovernmental unit. For
example, there is a state legislative game, a state administrative game, a district and school administration game, and a
teaching game. Each game has separate players, rewards,
inputs to other games, and provides outcomes to other games.'65
There obviously can be no complete census of the complex educational ecology. The purpose of this section is to explicate the
strategic underpinnings of but one of many educational games: the
interaction between states seeking educational reform (preferably
reform implemented by localities) and districts seeking survival
(preferably at the cost of as little reform as possible). The strategies
associated with this game do not determine outcomes-there are too
many other games-but they do shape the rewards, inputs, and
consequences that the game generates in the overall ecology. 6
A few concepts from elementary game theory suggest the
strategic elements of disestablishment. The state/district interaction can be stylized as a sequential two-player game in which
districts threatened with disestablishment first decide whether
and how much to reform, and states next decide whether to
disestablish.'6 7 Assume-as the previous sections argue one
164. See, e.g., William A. Firestone, EducationalPolicy as an Ecology of Games, 18 EDUC.
RESEARCHER 18 (1989); Marilyn Gittell, School Reform in New York and Chicago:Revisiting
the Ecology of Local Games, 30 URB. AFF. Q. 136 (1994).
165. FREDRICK M. WIRT & MICHAEL W. KIRST, THE POITICAL DYNAMIcs OF AMERICAN
EDUCATION 286 (1997) (citation omitted); see also STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 6 & n.5
(applying the "ecology of games" concept and attributing its first use to Norton Long, The
Local Community as an Ecology of Games, 64 AM. J. SOC. 251-61 (1958)).
166. The complexity of the overall system does not mean that the strategic issues
associated with a single interaction cannot be analyzed systematically. Marando and Reeves,
in their useful model of urban consolidations and other types of local government
reorganizations, argue persuasively that both state and local behavior must be treated as
endogenous when modeling intergovernmental politics. Marando & Reeves, supra note 68, at
997 ("[The study of local reorganization cannot be approached by examining exclusively
either state- or local-level actions."). They note in the local-reorganization context much of
what is argued here with regard to disestablishment: that even though states have the legal
authority to act unilaterally, they will rarely do so, because they must take into account local
needs, preferences, and political power. See id.
167. Sequential play seems to be the right model in light of the drawn-out timetables and
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should-that the state prefers to disestablish if the alternative is
no local reform at all, but prefers the district to reform itself so
that the state need not bear the costs of actually imposing the
disestablishment sanction.' 8 Districts approach a disestablishment threat with a strong preference to reform rather than to see
the threat carried through. Aware, however, that states also prefer
local reform to costly disestablishment, a rational district will
reform exactly up to the point that would satisfy the state sufficiently so that it would not impose the disestablishment sanction.
That is, districts depart just enough from their own preferences and
toward the preferences of states to convince states that disestablishment is not necessary.
In the sequential game, districts are never disestablished: the
district's dominant strategy is always to reform just enough to
induce state regulators to leave them alone. This simple sequential
game is thus analytically trivial, interesting only insofar as it
captures the intuition that disestablishment is a surprising
phenomenon. As noted above,' 69 districts facing disestablishment
are usually guilty of quite egregious malfeasance, are given ample
opportunities to ameliorate deficiencies, and can escape the
sanction by demonstrating relatively modest improvements. When
states do not attach positive political value to the act of takeover
itself, districts ought to seize the opportunity, every time, to reform
themselves at least enough to satisfy the state authorities and keep
their jobs. In more than a few cases-though still a very small
number relative to the number of districts nationwide-however,
they do not do so.170
Yet if one reconceptualizes the game as a standard signaling
game with asymmetric information, the occasional disestablishment
is consistent with rational and capable players. In this more
realistic game, the district continues to choose whether to reform
and by how much. This choice is then visible to the state, which
repeated state warnings that characterize the disestablishment process. See supra note 71
and accompanying text.
168. If a state prefers to disestablish a particular district regardless of whether the district
reforms on its own, it always does so. In such a case, district preferences do not matter and
there is no "game" at all, only a foregone conclusion determined by the state's political and
policy preferences.
169. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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decides whether to disestablish. Although state officials know their
own preferences, the district does not know, when it makes reform
decisions, enough about the shape of state preferences to determine
how serious the state is about disestablishment and what level of
reform is necessary to forestall state action.
There can be no doubt that districts have only incomplete
information about state standards. Most state accountability
programs include elaborate "academic watch lists" and similar early
warning and probationary systems.'' It is at this early phase that
performance criteria enshrined in legislation or regulation come
into play. The typical result is that a very large number of districts
or schools are put on probation-far more than can be realistically
subjected to sanctions. In New Jersey in 1988, as the state readied
a takeover plan for the Jersey City school system in the full public
eye, it also placed eight other districts at the highest level of
monitoring, making them eligible for similar sanctions.'7 2 In 1996,
Arkansas identified thirteen "academic[ally] distress[ed]" districts
subject to sanctions under its year-old takeover law.'73 In 1999, New
Mexico announced that the eleven "lowest performing" schools in
the state were eligible for takeover if they did not improve.' 74 As of
February 2000, Maryland's list of "reconstitution eligible" schools
had ninety-six entries, although these spanned only three school
districts. 7 ' In each of these states, districts or schools so listed were
required to work with state officials to ameliorate their deficiencies.
Assigning probationary status to a school or district is not a fullscale sanction. Precisely because of its systematic and widespread
use, probationary listing is not particularly threatening. Of the
eight districts other than Jersey City that New Jersey listed in
1988, the state disestablished only two more in the next seven years
(and no more have been disestablished since).'7 6 The thirteen
171. See supra note 111.
172. See Janet Gardner, Jersey City Schools Face State Action, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1987,
§ NJ, at 4.
173. David J. Hoff, Takeovers Threatened, 25 Ark. DistrictsAddress Deficiencies, EDUC.
WK., Oct. 2, 1996, at 17.
174. Matthew Franck, StrugglingSchools May Face Takeover by State: 'Fix-It-or-Else'Law
New to N.M., ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr. 12, 1999, at Al.
175. Darcia Harris Bowman, Private Firms Tapped to Fix Md. Schools, EDUC. WK, Feb.
9, 2000, at 1, 22.
176. See ZIEBARTH, supra note 137.
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Arkansas districts listed in 1996 surely knew that the state was not
about to invoke an untried and controversial law by sanctioning
them all, and may well have suspected-as in fact occurred-that
it would sanction none. In New Mexico, the eleven schools listed
under the untried takeover law had grounds for similar optimism.
Even if they wondered whether school takeovers might be more
palatable to the state than, say, district disestablishment, they
could read in the local Albuquerque Journal assurances from state
school superintendent Michael Davis and his staff that they would
"do whatever is necessary to avoid using such sanctions, which they
believe could do more harm than good if employed too liberally."1 77
In the case of the Maryland reconstitution eligibility list, it was
possible to imagine the state actually reconstituting many
schools.178 The districts nevertheless knew that the state was
unlikely to reconstitute half of the Baltimore school system when,
in six years of the reconstitution program, Maryland had listed
179
numerous schools but reconstituted none.
Of course, listing is not inconsequential. It is a true management
reform, a way of injecting outside technical expertise into the affairs
of schools and school systems in perennial distress. Listing also
carries some probability of sanctions, even if small. Three of the
ninety-six Maryland schools deemed "reconstitution eligible" in
2000 may well have been shocked when the state announced that
they would be the first actual reconstitutions under the state's
academic bankruptcy regime. 8 ° Their ninety-three luckier peer
institutions who were spared the axe may have been surprised as
well to learn that the likelihood of being disestablished was only
one in thirty-two. Still, most schools and districts will beat such
long odds, and they know it.

177. See Franck, supra note 174. Officials in other states have made similar statements.
See Joe Hainthaler, Ridge Plan Has Ultimatum for City School Districts that Failed to
Improve, Under the Governor'sProposalWould Come Under State Control, YORK DAILY REC.
(Pennsylvania), Feb. 10, 2000, at 1; Stephen Hegarty, Failing Schools Search for Ways to
Make Grade, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Florida), Aug. 16, 1999, at lB. Of course, such
statements are only evidence of state preferences, to be evaluated critically by districts
analyzing the state's seriousness.
178. See Bowman, supranote 175.
179. See id.
180. See id.
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Absent perfect knowledge, a district's willingness to reform
depends on its beliefs about state preferences. It may happen that
a district, believing incorrectly that disestablishment is a realistic
possibility, will reform unnecessarily in order to avoid it. The state,
presumably, is glad of such outcomes. Sometimes, a district will
reform less than is necessary, believing falsely that its state is
relatively disestablishment-averse, only to have its officials ousted
by a somewhat disappointed state. Disestablishment thus has both
more and less of an influence than it would if states and districts
did not suffer from information problems. Disestablishment, rather
than local reform, happens sometimes even to rational states and
school districts; but the possibility of disestablishment also induces
reform in districts where states had no intention of using the
sanction.
This account bears a strong resemblance to the classic model of
international deterrence that Robert Jervis presented in 1976.1"l In
that analysis, Jervis concludes both that existential threats can
deter destructive conflict and that their efficacy is not guaranteed." 2 International relations is of course an inexact analogy to
state-district relations; in particular, it presumes "juridically equal
which states and districts emphatically are not."M
actors,"'
Nevertheless, Jervis's analysis suggests that disestablishment
threats will have real but imperfect power to deter, but that their
efficacy can be undermined.
Jervis argues, for example, that deterrence is served when the
threatened party "is relatively weak or vulnerable [or] places an
especially high subjective value on preserving the lives and property
of its citizens. " 185 This description applies with great force to district
governments that have no constitutional protection but every
incentive to protect the interests of the employment regime. At the
same time, Jervis writes that it serves deterrence when the
threatening party permits "the other [to] retreat without breaking
important commitments" and "refrains from humiliating the
other, inflicting gratuitous punishment, raising demands that lack
181. ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1976).

182.
183.
184.
185.

See id. at 96-102.
See id. at 101.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
JERVIS, supra note 181, at 100.
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any legitimacy, or asking for something that is of significantly
greater value to the other than it is to the threatening party."'86
Disestablishment threats always sting, because they incorporate
the claim that district self-government has failed; but states often
compound the insult during the lead-up to disestablishment,
18 7
accusing targeted districts of both incompetence and venality.
Humiliation, therefore, plays a considerable role in takeover
politics.' Jervis notes similarly that "threats can fail if they are
applied in a case where the other side has situational advantages
and can 'design around' them'-not a bad description of the
implementation power-and failed threats may "increase the other
side's hostility by revealing the existence of great conflicts of
interest."'8 9
Perhaps most important, "deterrence may fail because the threat
is not believed. Deterrence theory stresses both the importance and
the difficulty of establishing credibility ....""o Players' beliefs are
vital. In the disestablishment game, the state knows that the
probability that a troubled district will reform itself depends on its
beliefs about the credibility of the states' disestablishment threat.
A state will therefore strive to affect districts' beliefs, in order to
maximize the probability that districts will reform themselves.
Taking state efforts to change district beliefs into account, disestablishment becomes a standard three-move signaling game. In the
first move, the state seeks to signal its type, i.e., whether it is
resolute when it threatens disestablishment. In the second, the
district selects a reform program based on its beliefs about state
type. In the final move, the state decides whether to disestablish,
based on its true type and on the district's choice of how much to
reform.' 91

186. Id. at 101.
187. See, e.g., Kimberly J. McLarin, New Jersey Preparesa Takeover ofNewark's Desperate
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1994, at Al.
188. See Paul Weaver, The Whitley County Story:A Study of State Intervention into a Poor,
Rural Appalachian County School District 20-21 (1991) (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation,
University of Kentucky, Lexington) (on file with the University of Kentucky Library).
189. See JERVIS, supra note 181, at 79-80.
190. Id. at 79.
191. For a general account of games of limited information and signaling, see JAMES D.
MoRRow, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 222-44 (1994).
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The central feature of such signaling games is that signals must
be credible to be effective. States cannot simply announce their
types and expect to be believed; it is too easy to lie. Districts simply
ignore such "cheap talk." 19 2 States seeking to signal their willingness to disestablish districts credibly have to do so by incurring
some of the costs of disestablishment that disestablishment-averse
states would be less willing to tolerate.'9 3
One such signal is the passage of legislation authorizing disestablishment, with its associated challenge to the institution of local
control and concomitant expenditure of political capital. The politics
surrounding the passage of such legislation carry real costs for state
officials; consequently, the signal functions effectively. Efforts to
pass such a law, if accompanied by logrolling, media publicity, and
incendiary rhetoric lauding its wisdom and necessity, galvanize
political opponents-especially interest groups like suburbanites,
teachers, and superintendents, whose opposition to disestablishment is generalized rather than tied to any specific district. Passing
legislation allows opponents to mobilize resources and solidify
resistance even before any particular disestablishment is contemplated. A failure to pass legislation, of course, is a fairly reliable
signal that a state is not planning on disestablishment.
That passing disestablishment legislation may be a credible
signal is illustrated by litigation that Texas pursued all the way to
the Supreme Court.' Texas's suit asked the Court to declare that
legislation authorizing disestablishment, which it had not yet
invoked, did not violate the provisions of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, under which Texas is a covered jurisdiction.'9 5 Neither the
U.S. Justice Department nor the federal district court had been
willing to issue such a declaration, although they did not invalidate
the law; instead, they ruled that Texas must take its chances
with voting rights lawsuits should it disestablish a district. 96 The
Supreme Court upheld the lower court's view completely and
192. David Austen-Smith, Strategic Models of Talk in PoliticalDecision Making, 13 INT'L
POL. Sci. REv. 45 (1992). Mere talk may be credible in situations where both players share
certain common interests, but such situations do not resemble disestablishment. See generally

id.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See MORROW, supra note 191, at 241.
Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296 (1998).
See id. at 299.
See id.
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unanimously, ruling the case "[un] ripe" for decision because "Texas
has not pointed to any particular school district in which the
application of [the disestablishment provisions at issue] is currently
1 97
foreseen or even likely."
Why did Texas press a suit it knew would likely be held nonjusticiable? After all, when the state took over the Wilmer-Hutchins
district in Dallas in 1996, it had asked for and received-after a
three-month delay-voting rights approval from the Justice
Department.'9 8 The most plausible explanation is that Texas was
seeking to strengthen its signal. It wanted districts to know that it
could make disestablishment decisions free of second-guessing by
the Justice Department. Given that doubts existed, and that it had
applied to the Justice Department before, Texas thought that the
threat of disestablishment would be enhanced if the federal
government announced a nonintervention policy in advance. It
wanted that declaration, quite reasonably, even though it had no
particular disestablishment in mind. 19
While legislating may not be cost-free, it is still largely talk and
in that sense "cheap."2 °0 Serious signals, by contrast, are usually
expensive. A state, S, wishing to convince a district, D, that it is not
disestablishment-averse must incur costs that disestablishmentaverse states would not tolerate.2 0 The obvious way to do this is for
S to disestablish anotherdeficient school district, D " Such a move
has obvious consequences for D I but it is also a strong signal to D
that the state might seriously consider disestablishing it as well,
and that D accordingly should undertake more aggressive reforms.
The extent to which the disestablishment ofD 'will affect the beliefs
of D depends critically, though by no means exclusively, on D's
beliefs about how similar S's attitudes are towards D and D . If D
197. Id. at 300.
198. See Alexei Barrionuevo & Aline McKenzie, Troubled Schools Taken over by State;
Wilmer-Hutchins Official 'Disgusted'by TEA Move, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 7, 1996, at
1A.
199. Ironically, precisely the facts that motivated Texas's suit-that the state had solicited
Justice Department approval for the Wilmer-Hutchins takeover and that Texas had no
particular districts targeted for takeover at the time of the suit-were cited by the Supreme
Court in denying Texas's claim. See Texas, 523 U.S. at 301.
200. See Austen-Smith, supra note 192.
201. See, e.g., Dani Rodrik, Promises,Promises: CrediblePolicy Reform Via Signaling, 99
ECON. J. 756, 757-58 (1989).
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is similar to D "in its educational problems and political circumstances, beliefs might change a good deal; but if D is worlds apart
from D , its fate may be irrelevant." 2
This section has not offered a formal model of disestablishment.
The ecology of games makes impossible a model that is both useful
and formal. Even the stylized interaction described here, in which
the final move of a state's game with any given district also
functions as the first signaling move in that state's game with other
districts, defies useful mathematization. Moreover, the game
between a state and each of its districts is repeated an indeterminate number of times, and the status of ongoing games may affect
the optimal strategies in other games in each iteration-with
results that then feed back.2 °3 Similarly, the necessary vagueness
of state preferences, which depend on fairly amorphous notions of
political advantage, provides little insight into the precise location
of an equilibrium in a well-defined policy space.
The intention here, by applying elementary game theory to the
disestablishment interaction, is to argue that an accountability
program consisting of performance standards and disestablishment
sanctions allows states to move distressed local districts in the
direction of reform. Local power over implementation generally
dooms state efforts to impose reform hierarchically; and local
autonomy has led to the development of an entrenched educational
establishment organized primarily around the goal of bringing
economic benefits, and especially employment benefits, to their
202. One more observation is necessary to complete the classic signaling narrative: states'
first move requires them to balance the costs they incur by signaling and the benefits
associated with the district's receipt of the signal. Whether signaling is in states' strategic
interest depends on the particular equilibrium of the signaling game, which is a function of
the players' beliefs and incentives. Signaling games may have equilibria in which the
signaling player signals its type with 100% accuracy, not at all, or something in between
('separating," "pooling," and "semiseparating" equilibria, respectively). See MORROW, supra
note 191, at 225. That about half the states authorize disestablishment in varying degrees,
see supra note 69, is consistent with a semiseparating equilibrium. States are not "pooling,"
because twenty-five of fifty states have sent the relatively cheap signal of passing a
disestablishment law, while the rest have not; and they are not "separating," because in a
separating equilibrium, states would signal their type perfectly and districts would be able
to act to forestall disestablishment in all cases. See MORROW, supra note 191, at 225-26. A
semiseparating equilibrium is consistent with the strong role of uncertainty in accountability
politics: states are unable to communicate clearly their intentions to districts, and districts
must base their actions on their best guesses about what states really intend.
203. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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districts-an "employment regime. "2°4 Nevertheless, if a state
threatens to unseat local district governments whose performance
it deems inadequate, even an employment regime-with its
extraordinarily strong preferences for unreformed employmentoriented practices-has overwhelming incentives to embrace
educational change and thus to avoid the penalty. This does not,
however, make accountability a straightforward policy of deterrence, in which states explain to districts what they must do and
districts then do it in order to avoid greater pain. To be sure, the
system is characterized by deterrence: districts are deterred by
disestablishment threats into undertaking reforms that they
otherwise would strongly prefer to avoid. Yet because disestablishment is costly for states, because those costs vary, because states
vary both in their own reform agendas and in their willingness to
impose disestablishment sanctions, and because these differences
are difficult for districts to detect reliably, states cannot simply
tell districts what they want and expect to be believed. Districts will
be suspicious that states are trying to bluff them into too much
reform. States can only seek to signal their intentions to districts
as credibly as possible.
For reform, this has both positive and negative implications. On
the negative side, it implies that some districts are disestablished
not only, or even primarily, because of their own performance but
because the state seeks to send a signal to other districts. Such
an instrumental application of sanctions is unfair. Perhaps even
more troubling, adopting a system which unavoidably creates an
atmosphere of incomplete information between states and districts
conflicts with the reasonable goal of improving communication
between state and district. Disestablishment sanctions "institutionalize distrust between levels of government." °5 This seems
particularly undesirable when one of the linchpins of accountability
204. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
205. Richard F. Elmore, Education and Federalism:Doctrinal,Functional, and Strategic
Views, in SCHOOL DAYS, RULE DAYS: THE LEGALIZATION AND REGULATION OF EDUCATION 166,
183 (David L. Kirp & Donald N. Jensen eds., 1986). Elmore finds that federal expenditures
for education, accompanied by "accusatory rhetoric" about local education policies,
"institutionalized distrust" between the federal and state governments. See id. at 183-84.
Similarly, disestablishment threats by states often include accusatory rhetoric about school
officials, breeding distrust between states and districts. See supra notes 186-89 and
accompanying text.
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programs is the establishment of clear standards. When accountability plays out in the real world of politics, clarity dissipates.
The positives, however, outweigh the negatives. Districts facing
a threat of disestablishment-the probability of which they cannot
know with total confidence-face internalized incentives, rather
than simply external directives, to reform. They will not undertake
the impossible, but given the overwhelming cost of the sanction
they have good reason to push themselves quite hard (even if they
think the probability of punishment is substantially less than
unity). States, of course, can utilize districts' incomplete information to push districts fairly aggressively in desired directions,
without having to invent top-down regulations that might be
infeasible, unnecessary, or easily subverted. Particularly good for
states is that this applies to all districts that fear disestablishment,
a substantially larger group than the set of all districts that a state
could realistically disestablish. Accountability induces reform across
all of a state's most troubled school districts.
Those who bemoan educational bureaucracy have attributed its
failures too quickly to overarching approaches to governancehierarchical control on the left, public management of any kind on
the right-rather than asking, more conservatively, how existing
institutions might be modified to create more salutary incentives.
When Chubb and Moe argue that society should move to marketbased education, their claim is that publicly governed schools are
inevitably captured by interests other than those of children.2 °6
This Article argues that the problems these critics identify are
concomitants not of bureaucracy per se-or even of state
bureaucracy per se-but of particular bureaucratic arrangements.
Incentives within a given bureaucratic and political structure are
not fixed. Educational competition can be enhanced, not stymied,
by way of political institutions rather than by way of markets.
Accountability offers an alternative both to hierarchical bureaucracy and to the market by institutionalizing intergovernmental
competition for control of the schools. Like school choice, it relies on
the self-interest of district officials, rather than on top-down
bureaucratic pronouncements, to produce results. At the same time,
by harnessing the state-district intergovernmental structure of
206. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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American education, the approach offers those who eschew private
educational markets a thoroughly public approach to structural
reform.
Most likely this path to reform was not anticipated fully by those
who advocated accountability policy. But it is the path that
accountability offers, and it is a promising one.
II. OTHER ACTORS
Institutions other than states have sought to promote school
reform through accountability. Advocates of judicially mandated
school reform have welcomed accountability with interest, and it
has generated a genuine paroxysm in federal education policy,
which was recast around accountability principles by the No Child
Left Behind Act of 2001.207 Judicial and federal institutions,
however, have assumed that if states can induce district reforms
through accountability policies, they can as well. This Article
suggests that this is not necessarily so. States can catalyze reform
effectively not only because accountability is their policy but also
because of the incentives states face and districts' partial knowledge
of those incentives. This Part analyzes the quite different circumstances associated with efforts by courts and the federal government to insist upon district accountability. Not only are these
institutional arrangements less likely than state accountability
programs to yield reforms in very distressed districts, but they may
well undermine state accountability programs that do have
potential for success.
A. Courts
Judicial policing of intergovernmental relationships is a familiar
American practice. It is therefore unsurprising that districts subject
to disestablishment have litigated various claims that the sanction
violates statutory or constitutional law. It is scarcely more surprising that they have had almost no success.2 °8 Cases that address
207. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (Supp. II 2002).
208. Disestablishment has been held consistent with the due process rights of removed
local officials so long as prior notice and informal pre-removal hearings are given. See, e.g.,
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disestablishment per se, however, are at the periphery of judicial
involvement in accountability policy. Rather, the essential cases are
those that address whether a state's public schools meet state
constitutional guarantees of equal protection and of adequate public
education. Ajudicial declaration that a state school-finance system,
or the set of educational services it provides, is unconstitutional
requires both states and districts to shift in order to meet, or to
resist, judicial demands.

E. St. Louis Fed'n of Teachers, Local 1220 v. E. St. Louis Dist. No. 189 Fin. Oversight Panel,
687 N.E.2d 1050, 1061-62 (Ill. 1997). Courts have also rejected arguments that legislation
permitting disestablishment of only certain districts, i.e., those in large cities, violates state
constitutional guarantees against special legislation. See Moore v. Detroit Sch. Reform Bd.,
293 F.3d 352, 358-63 (6th Cir. 2002); Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 408-09 (6th Cir. 1999); cf
Shook v. D.C. Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance Auth., 132 F.3d 775, 781-84 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (holding that Congress has authority to abrogate home rule in the District of Columbia,
and to give plenary power over education to a control board, but that the control board lacked
statutory power to delegate its authority further to a board of trustees). As to equal protection
claims, courts have (properly) evaluated states' differential treatment of schools with similar
levels of distress-disestablishing some but not others-under a rational basis standard
rather than by applying heightened scrutiny, and concluded that such treatment does not of
itself violate equal protection guarantees. See McKnight v. Hayden, 65 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("While other school districts may have been in distress, the Legislature is
not constitutionally required to respond to every district."). When plaintiffs have argued that
disestablishment of their predominantly minority districts was due to racial animus against
nonwhite residents or leaders, the courts have held such allegations to be without factual
basis in the record. See, e.g., Moore, 293 F.3d at 370; McKnight, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 120-21.
Each of these cases seems decided correctly and none has generated any substantial legal
controversy.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit understands disestablishment of a school district as shifting that
district from an elected to an appointed system of school government. See Mixon, 195 F.3d at
404. It therefore holds that disestablishment cannot violate Section 2 of the federal Voting
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000), which forbids any "standard, practice, or procedure" that,
interalia, provides to racial minorities "less opportunity than other members of the electorate
to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." Id. Although
"Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act requires only a showing of discriminatory effect" rather
than one of discriminatory intent, "Section 2 only applies to elective, not appointive, systems,"
and the system in disestablished districts is made an appointive one; therefore, there is no
violation. Mixon, 193 F.3d at 407. Of course, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which deals
with alterationsin voting procedures that work to minorities' electoral disadvantage, "applies
also to ... state decisions as to which offices shall be elective." Presley v. Etowah County
Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 501 (1992) (citing Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 564-65
(1969)). This seems to include disestablishment. The Assistant Attorney General of the United
States, prior to the filing of Texas v. United States in federal court, took the position that
takeover "may" implicate Section 5. Texas, 523 U.S. at 299. To date, however, the merits of
this question have not been litigated in a jurisdiction covered by Section 5.
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The extensive history of state court involvement in mandating
education reform has been told well, and analyzed at length, by
many commentators. °9 A pr6cis: the past three decades have seen
numerous lawsuits filed with the goal of forcing improvement in
deficient school districts. After the federal courts' refusal to order
the equalization of school finance across poor and wealthy
districts,2 10 a refusal that marked the end of the so-called first wave
of school reform litigation,2 1 ' reformers shifted their attention to the
state courts, seeking to take Justice William Brennan's invitation
to find rights or protections in state constitutions that are stronger
than those guaranteed by the federal document. They brought a
second wave 212 of education-finance cases, arguing that interdistrict
inequities in education spending violated state constitutional
guarantees of equal protection.2 13 These were followed by a third
wave of cases claiming that distressed districts' failure to provide
an adequate education contravened state constitutional language
guaranteeing public education that can be characterized as "thorough," "efficient," "suitable," or by some similar adjective.2 14
Both equal protection and adequacy claims continue to be made
in state courts today, although the "second wave" equality theory is
generally thought to be in decline 21' and the "third wave" adequacy
theory ascendant. 2 16 As Michael Heise notes, the third wave of
school equality lawsuits takes up Rodriguez's suggestion that there
209. See, e.g., REED, supra note 23, at 11-14; Liebman & Sabel, supranote 116, at 201-07;
James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249,266-72 (1999); William E. Thro,
The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky and Texas Decisions on the Future of
Public School FinanceReform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219, 222-32 (1990).
210. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973). The
Rodriguez Court, reasoning that public education is not a fundamental constitutional right
and wealth not a suspect class, applied rational basis scrutiny to uphold wealth differentials
across school districts. Id.
211. See Ryan, supra note 209, at 266.
212. The "wave" metaphor originates with William Thro and has been widely adopted. See
Thro, supra note 209, at 222.
213. See id. at 266.
214. See Molly McUsic, The Use of EducationClauses in School FinanceReform Litigation,
28 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 307, 333-39 (1991).
215. See Peter Enrich, Leaving EqualityBehind:New Directionsin School FinanceReform,
48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 143 (1995) (stating that the second wave was dismissed as a
"disappointing" failure).
216. See id. at 183 ("adequacy arguments should be the tools of ... education finance
reform").
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might be an "identifiable quantum of education [that] is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of'
educational rights.2 17 Third wave suits fasten upon these clauses as
guarantees of an adequate education that low-performing districts
fail to meet. In Rose v. Council for Better Education, generally
regarded as dating the beginning of the third wave and as the
leading third-wave case,21 the Kentucky Supreme Court held that
"[elach child, every child, in this Commonwealth must be provided
with an equal opportunity to have an adequate education."" 9 The
Kentucky court's pronouncement that "[elquality is the key word
here"2 was merely the undertow of the second wave pulling at the
hems of the judges' robes. In fact, the key word is "adequate": "every
child" in Kentucky has an equal right to an education only up to the
point of adequacy.2"2 '
The second and third wave theories, however, have not been
embraced universally. In many states, courts have refused to
intervene in educational reform, insisting that the issue is essentially a political question or is otherwise nonjusticiable.2 22 In those
states where courts have endorsed a second or third wave theory,
implementation has been spotty and political resistance substan223
tial.
Clearly, the realignment of educational practice brought about by
accountability programs has important implications for these lines

217. Michael Heise, State Constitutions,School Finance Litigation,and the "ThirdWave"-:
From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1163 n.102 (1995) (quoting San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973)).
218. See Ryan, supra note 209, at 268 & n.80.
219. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989).
220. Id.
221. Equity and adequacy are, of course, related concepts even as they are doctrinally
distinct. The definition of what constitutes adequate education depends heavily upon the
practices and outcomes of other school districts. See REED, supra note 23, at 13; Avidan Y.
Cover, Note, Is "Adequacy" a More "PoliticalQuestion" than "Equality?": The Effect of
Standards-BasedEducation on Judicial Standardsfor Education Finance, 11 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 403, 405 (2002) ("equality concerns inform the adequacy argument").
222. See Molly S. McUsic, The Law's Role in the Distributionof Education: The Promises
and Pitfalls of School FinanceLitigation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR
PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 88,90 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999) ("In fact, judges often feel
unqualified to decide how much money it would take to give children of unequal needs an
equal education and so would return the issue to the legislature....").
223. See supra notes 155-62 and accompanying text.
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of cases. One enticing view is that accountability programs buttress
the third wave theory by mooting a common objection: defining
adequacy is an essentially political judgment for which courts are
unequipped, either because they are institutionally incapable of
sound definition or because the decision is properly assigned to
popularly elected branches of state government. State legislatures,
the argument goes, have now through their accountability statutes
specified standards that define what constitutes an adequate
education. Judges facing third wave claims therefore are relieved of
the duty to define adequacy. Instead, courts can simply measure the
achievements of the schools against standards that the political
branches themselves have laid out 22 4---or, in the alternative, insist
that lawmakers define adequacy legislatively.22 5
This Article, however, takes the opposite position: the rise of
accountability programs makes judicial policymaking regarding
educational quality a shakier endeavor than ever before. To convert
legislative accountability standards into a judicial yardstick for
the constitutional adequacy of school performance is to misuse
legislated educational standards. Such legislation is not merely
aspirational or hortatory, but neither does it set out criteria against
which states intend that the performance of all schools at all times
be judged. Instead, as Part I argues, states should be able to set a
high formal bar for accountability expecting that many districts will
not reach that bar. This permits them to signal their intentions and
induce as many districts as possible to undertake reforms.
The gap between official standards and states' genuine expectations is clearest from the districts' perspective. From their point of
view, a state's true standard of adequacy is defined by what the
state does rather than by what it says. What levels of funding,
educational inputs, minimum test scores, and basic educational
224. See James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: PoliticalReconstruction,
LiberalRecollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 VA. L. REV. 349,415-16
(1990); Liebman & Sabel, supra note 116, at 282 ("[N]ew standards and the associated
accountability regime substantially reduce the possibility for judicial caprice by giving
substance to the interpretation of rights and remedies that courts cannot derive from doctrine
alone."); McUsic, supra note 222, at 90-91; James E. Ryan & Thomas Saunders, Foreword to
Symposium on School FinanceLitigation:Emerging Trends or New Dead Ends?, 22 YALE L.
& POLVY REV. 463,472-73 (2004).
225. See Josh Kagan, Note, A Civics Action: Interpreting"Adequacy"in State Constitutions'
Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241, 2251 (2003).
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policies will, if not achieved, be deemed by the state so utterly
unacceptable that the state will be willing to invest in disestablishing the district? Districts seek to learn that standard and to meet
it because otherwise they face genuine and painful consequences.
Similarly, districts consider themselves successful if they meet that
standard and avoid the consequences, regardless of whether they
fail to meet the state's official "standards" or whether the state
might prefer the district to reform even more.
As Part I argues, states' genuine preference-the adequacy
standard defined by what it is prepared to do-can be known by
districts only with less-than-complete confidence. This standard, by
definition, does not match the more demanding standards that
states articulate in their education codes. Because the latter is
effectively a ceiling for the former, states would be foolish to make
them identical. By articulating high standards, states have the
potential to galvanize a wide range of districts to undertake
reform-including many districts that the state has neither the
desire nor the capability to sanction.
Because states make the final decision whether to disestablish
based on their private judgment rather than on public legislation
articulating objective standards, they can reward such districts for
a wide range of efforts and encourage their continuation. A policy
that would actually hold all districts to very high public standards,
however, lacks this advantage. Districts, aware that the state
cannot disestablish all (or even many) of them effectively, would
recognize in standards not fully attainable except by the few an
essentially hortatory, unenforceable message. With that recognition, the districts would not feel compelled to reform, and the state
standards would be dismissed as cheap talk.
Courts, therefore, are ill-advised to treat educational standards
articulated by the legislature as a good rubric for assessing the
adequacy of school districts for three reasons. First, the legislature
does not mean to define adequacy when it defines academic
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standards; it is doing something else.22 6 To use legislated standards
to define adequacy is, thus, to misstate the legislature's opinions.
Second, establishing a very high, largely unattainable bar for
district performance discourages districts from experimenting with
reforms that do seem feasible. If the courts hold every district to
adequacy as defined formally by the legislature, they define an
individual right. When defining a right, courts cannot, unlike state
governments, say one thing and mean another. Should a plaintiff
choose to bring suit against a district, that district must be judged
against the defined district obligations.22 v That a district is improving in particular ways cannot justify its failure to meet constitutional standards.
Finally, adoption of legislated standards, as a measure of
constitutional adequacy, declaws a state's own ability to use
accountability to wrest widespread reform from a range of districts.
States must embrace whatever standard the judiciary announces as
the floor for an adequate education. Once it does so, districts need
not wonder what state standards are. This makes it impossible for
states to take advantage of incomplete information, using the threat
of disestablishment to deter complacency among districts anxious
to avoid sanctions from a state of whose intentions they are unsure.
That would not be a bad result if the courts could compel
straightforwardly all districts to comply with judicially ratified
legislative sanctions. This is not, however, the likely outcome.
Regardless of whether judges can define adequacy more accurately
and more legitimately using legislative standards than they did
226. This argument gains additional force as some states remake their academic standards
under pressure from the federal No Child Left Behind Act. States have formal discretion
under the Act to define their standards at will. See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
Some may find it politically difficult to legislate overtly loose standards, and instead
articulate standards they do not plan to reach while plotting bureaucratic noncompliance. See
generally infra Part II.B (discussing the requirements of the federal No Child Left Behind Act
20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578, and possible state actions regarding compliance). Others may choose,
under pressure from the Act, to legislate standards that they believe are less demanding than
adequacy requires. See Ryan, supra note 3, at 947-48; infra note 274 and accompanying text
(stating that some states are considering foregoing federal education dollars because they are
unwilling to comply with the Act's adequacy standards).
227. The courts themselves have recognized the particular power of the state to act
arbitrarily vis-A-vis its districts. See McKnight v. Hayden, 65 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) ("While other school districts may have been in distress, the Legislature is not
constitutionally required to respond to every district."); supra note 208.
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when defining it on their own, legislation does not address the
primary flaw of the third wave theory: the paucity and ineffectiveness of judicial remedies. Financial remedies, which through a
variety of schemes sought to buttress the budgets of distressed
districts, have met substantial political resistance and have not
proven to result in school improvement."I Some courts, like the
bellwether New Jersey Supreme Court, have supplemented
financial remedies with directives that districts establish a range
of specific programs;2 29 but there is no reason to expect courts to be
more able than state departments of education to overcome
successfully the monopoly over program implementation that local
officials enjoy. There are myriad ways for local officials and teachers
to ignore, foot-drag, or subvert externally imposed reform programs.
This is true a fortiori about orders from the courts, where the
problems are multiplied by the fact that the party ordered to reform
228. See Ryan, supra note 209, at 458-71; see also Kimberly D. Bartman, Comment, Public
Education in the 21' Century: How Do We Ensure that No Child Is Left Behind?, 12 TEMP.
POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REv. 95, 109 (2002). A growing literature in educational economics
demonstrates that levels of per-pupil expenditure lack a consistent, statistically significant
relationship with levels of student achievement. See generally DOES MONEY MATTER? THi
EFFECT OF SCHOOL RESOURCES ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT AND ADULT SUCCESS (Gary Burtless
ed., 1996) (applying a variety of evidence and methods and failing to reach consensus
regarding the impact of school spending on achievement). Although it is clear that a child's
individual school assignment can have a substantial and significant impact on that child's
educational achievement, growing the budgets of distressed schools is, in general, dubious
medicine. To be sure, the issue is debated hotly on both technical and policy grounds, see
generally id. (documenting disagreement on the influence of school spending), and the courts
have been generally unsympathetic to econometric evidence suggesting that new resources
do not systematically translate into school improvements. See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No.
25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 498-99 (Ark. 2002):
[T]he State makes the implausible argument that more money spent on
education does not correlate to better student performance.... The State's
argument is farfetched in this court's opinion. We are convinced that motivated
teachers, sufficient equipment to supplement instruction, and learning in
facilities that are not crumbling or overcrowded, all combine to enhance
educational performance.... All of that takes money.
Id.; see also Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 340-41 (N.Y. 2003);
Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417,439 (N.J. 1997). But as achievement stagnates in
a growing number of distressed districts-notwithstanding large budget increases over the
past decade, several of which were court ordered-courts may yet come to acknowledge that
when "policymakers [cannot] reliably identify programs that do and do not work," there is
little sense in providing additional funds to educators whose "judgments have not been
accurate in the past." Eric A. Hanushek, Conclusions and Controversies About the
Effectiveness of School Resources, 4 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POLY REV. 11, 23 (1998).
229. See Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 710 A.2d 450, 473 (N.J. 1998).
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is the state, while the party that must carry out reforms is the local
district.3 ° Intergovernmental implementation of complicated and
difficult-to-assess education reforms lends itself well to delay,
confusion, conflict, and the "token compliance," which Donald Kettl
describes as "meeting the terms of the rules without conforming
with their goals."23 ' None of these problems are obviated by using
a legislatively rather than judicially crafted definition of adequacy.
All courts can know with confidence is that whatever programs they
mandate will be implemented by the same personnel who run the
inadequate system that courts seek to change-hardly a cause for
optimism.
The argument of this Article might suggest one other potentially
efficacious, although ultimately unavailing, tactic for courts. Courts
could copy the tactic that states use to subvert the local implementation monopoly; they could, like states, order disestablishment
of districts that they deem inadequate." 2 Court-ordered disestablishment would replicate the salutary incentives for districts
associated with state disestablishment: districts would confront a
230. See HENIG, supra note 58, at 180-84; Paul Berman, From Compliance to Learning:
Implementing Legally-Induced Reform, in SCHOOLDAYS, RULE DAYS, supra note 205, at 46-49;
Cohen, supra note 20, at 476-86, 488-89.
231. DONALD F. KETrL, THE REGULATION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 8 (1987); see also Sipple
et al., supra note 89, at 161-62 (reporting that some school districts responded to escalating
graduation requirements imposed by New York State with "passive compliance" and "gaming
and reporting tricks").
232. See generally Saiger, supra note 162, at 1831 (arguing that courts should require
states to disestablish inadequate school districts in states where the legislature has
authorized the practice). Courts have, in fact, adopted this remedy in a very small number of
cases. See id. at 1853 & nn.111-14. In the most prominent instance, a federal district court
that had retained jurisdiction over the desegregation of the Cleveland school district declared
a "crisis of magnitude," Reed v. Rhodes, 934 F. Supp. 1533, 1560 (N.D. Ohio 1996), involving
the district's "total ... collapse," id. at 1539, and ordered the school system placed under direct
state control. Id. at 1558-61. A federal court in Kansas City threatened similar action, urging
state oversight of the Kansas City school district's operations as the district moved toward
unitary status on the grounds that its district leadership was "not up to th[e] task." Jenkins
v. Missouri, 959 F. Supp. 1151, 1178 (W.D. Mo. 1997). The Kansas City threat, however, was
never actualized. There has also been at least one court-ordered disestablishment in the
context of a second and third wave claim not involving desegregation: the Supreme Court of
California affirmed a lower court's order requiring the state to take over a district that had
threatened to close its schools six weeks before the scheduled end of the school year for lack
of funds. The California court based its decision on the second wave rationale that states owe
a "constitutional duty, aside from the equal allocation of educational funds, to prevent the
budgetary problems of a particular school district from depriving its students of 'basic'
educational equality." Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Cal. 1992).
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system where their deficient performance would result not in new
court-ordered funds or programs, but in real pain. Districts would,
therefore, become attentive to, and seek to meet, judicial standards
of adequacy. Moreover, because the court could order the state to
disestablish the district and appoint a substitute administration,
the judiciary would avoid the myriad problems, noted by Susan
Sturm in a different context, of direct judicial involvement in
institutional management: high visibility and controversy, inflexibility, polarization of opposing interests, perceived illegitimacy, and
limited control over the bureaucracy.2 33
When disestablishment is ordered judicially, however, the court
does not simply substitute itself for the state as the source of the
preferences districts must address, whereupon states and districts
otherwise proceed identically as they would if preferences emanated
from the state. This is true for the same reasons that judicial
reliance on state legislative standards is counterproductive. 234 It is
much more difficult for courts than states to maintain ambiguity
regarding their preferences. Judicial disestablishment orders must
announce, or at least rely upon, coherent, public, and consistent
reasons for holding a target district's educational practices legally
inadequate. 2 5 Districts will be relatively less unsure whether the
courts will come after them next if they know the judges must hew
to their stated rationales. The public nature of judicial preferences
alone should result in less diverse deterrence than incompletely
revealed state preferences can achieve.
Similarly, courts lack a state's institutional power to act arbitrarily or not at all. States can decide with impunity whether and
where to pursue disestablishment. This permits states to leverage
a threat, inducing reform in several districts at the cost of unseating only one. Districts may assume that they are targets when in
fact they are not; or, unsure which district among several candidates the state prefers to disestablish, a potentially targeted district
233. See Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma:StrategiesofJudicialIntervention
in Prisons,138 U. PA. L. REV. 805,905-06 (1990) (discussing court direction of prison systems).
234. See supra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
235. See LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES 200-01 (2004) (arguing that the
constitutional judge engages in "reflective equilibration," a process of"mov[ing] back and forth
between general propositions and specific cases, with the goal of finding those general
propositions that seem satisfactory as the basis for her decisions over the run of cases").
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may undertake partial reform in hopes that even should it fail fully
to address the state's concerns, it might convince the state to turn
its attention elsewhere. This ambiguity as to target is unavailable
to courts. A court that finds a violation and orders disestablishment
cannot avoid doing likewise in materially similar cases arising in
other districts.3 6 Moreover, because courts, unlike states, lack
control over their own agendas, such cases "arise" in the passive
voice. Courts cannot reliably prevent suits from being brought nor
avoid deciding them. If a plaintiff brings a suit in a state where the
adequacy theory has been ratified and judicial disestablishment
embraced as a remedy, a court may be compelled to act. A regime
of court-ordered disestablishment thus gives substantial power to
private plaintiffs.
Rather than buttressing the third wave, then, the rise of
accountability systems should be understood to constrain further
the ability of state courts to influence educational policymaking.
The embrace of legislative standards as the salvation of the third
wave understands accountability as yet another step in the
Progressive-era quest to depoliticize education2 37 and render
schooling a professionalized, technocratic endeavor immune from
the passions, vagaries, and unfairnesses of the political rough-andtumble.23 8 In truth, however, accountability must function in school
districts that are thoroughly politicized, with actors interested in
furthering their own agendas and preserving their power.23 9 It is
both unavoidable and, from the state's perspective, desirable for
accountability-based reforms to be fundamentally political. Indeed,
accountability programs offer states the opportunity to put politics
back into education.24 They operate by facing districts with the
political threat that some other politically elected body will deprive

236. See id.
237. For a discussion of Progressive-era education reform, see DAVID TYACK, THE ONE BEST
SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN URBAN EDUCATION 182-88 (1974).
238. The No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6587 (Supp. II 2002), with its
emphasis upon standardized measurement and its devotion to "[sicientifically based"
pedagogical methods, reveals similar Progressive-style commitments. See infra Part II.B.
239. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
240. Stone and his colleagues argue: "America spent most of the twentieth century trying
to take politics out of education. That was a mistake.... [WMe see the solutions as well as the
problems as lying within the political realm." STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 1, 3-4.
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them of their own political power. With its progressive veneer
stripped away, accountability is as political as a program can be.
This understanding gives new resonance to the views of those
state courts that have abstained from the question of how to
improve school quality. "lit is no part of the duty of the courts of
the State," declared the Illinois Supreme Court, to define adequate
education "by judicial construction."2" Such definition, said the
court, "may be and doubtless is a proper question for the determination of the legislature," and "must be undertaken in a legislative
forum rather than in the courts." 2 Today's public school systems
are characterized not only by problems courts have already
recognized-goals understood incompletely, best practices difficult
to specify, bureaucrats unresponsive to direction, and institutions
beset by huge and ever-worsening problems largely not of their own
making-but also, in today's era of accountability, by intergovernmental sanctions, threats, posturing, signaling, and incomplete
information. One can demur to Professor Helen Hershkoffs
argument that state courts are institutions with rightful roles in the
political and policymaking process who owe less deference than
their federal counterparts to executives and legislatures,2 4 3 and still
doubt whether courts can harness these forces effectively.
B. Washington
In a striking development, the rise of accountability in the states
spurred national authorities to intervene in details of school
governance that not long ago would have been understood univer241. Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1190 (Ill. 1996) (citation omitted).
242. Id. at 1190, 1196; see also Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla. v. Oklahoma, 746 P.2d 1135,
1150 (Okla. 1987) ("When thef methods [exercised by the Legislature in providing a school
system for the state] are challenged, the only justiciable question is whether the Legislature
acted within its power."); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 58 (R.I. 1995) (stating
that the court "believe[s] the proper forum for ] deliberation is the General Assembly, not the
courtroom"); cf Ex parte James, 713 So. 2d 869, 904 (Ala. 1997) (Hooper, C.J., dissenting)
(comparing judicial interference in efforts by the "legislative and executive branches ... to
balance the competing educational philosophies vying for supremacy in Alabama" to the
actions of "a 'strong man' dictator who coercively enforces one philosophy upon all the
people"); see also Saiger, supra note 162, at 1834-35 & nn. 15-19 (citing these and other cases).
243. See generally Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions:The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999) (rejecting the applicability of
federal-style rationality review to claims of right under state constitutions).
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sally to be purely local matters. The federal No Child Left Behind
Act (NCLBA), 24 which extends standards-based accountability
requirements to all states as a condition of their receipt of the major
source of federal school aid, has shaken up educational politics
and policy nearly to the point of concussion. 245 The Act alters
Washington's role in education perhaps as significantly as did the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA),2 46 which
inaugurated substantial federal funding for public schooling2 47 and
whose programs the NCLBA reauthorizes. Every public school in
the country is subject to accountability standards under the new
Act. 2 ' The preferences of regulators in Washington now dominate
the school-reform agenda.
The strong influence of the accountability laws of Texas and other
states upon the NCLBA is immediately apparent.2 49 The NCLBA
makes "adequate yearly progress" its central accountability
metric,2 5 ° defining it as annual improvement in the number of
251
students scoring at or above a cutoff on criterion-referenced tests.
Identified racial and demographic subgroups of students, along
with the student population as a whole, must each demonstrate
adequate yearly progress.25 2 Both schools and "local educational
agencies"- school districts for the most part-must make adequate
yearly progress or face sanctions.25 3 States rather than the federal
244. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578 (Supp. II 2002).
245. Although the Act passed with support from both parties, see Rudalevige, supra note
4, at 37-42, bipartisanship quickly evaporated. See also SUNDERMAN, supra note 6, at 9. In the
current environment, the Act is remarkable for its ability to make ardent states-righters out
of its liberal opponents and to make champions of both activist government and class-based

categorization of children out of its Republican supporters. But perhaps these contradictions
are illusory. See Hochschild, supra note 1, at 228 ("Republicans are pretending to be
compassionate in order to be conservative, and Democrats are pretending to be tough-minded
in order to be tender-hearted."); Liebman & Sabel, supra note 128, at 1727 (noting charges on
the left that the Act is a "shill for privatization").
246. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27
(1965) (current version at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (Supp. II 2002)).
247. See Dahmus, supra note 3, at 21.
248. See Ryan, supra note 3, at 932-33. Accountability sanctions, however, are limited to
school systems receiving ESEA funds.
249. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 128, at 1721.
250. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(A) (Supp. II 2002).
251. See id. § 6311(b)(2)(C).
252. See id. § 6311(b)(3)(C)(xiii).
253. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(A)(iii).
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government, however, have the power to design their own tests and
define what constitutes a passing score. 4
In contrast to the toothless federal legislation that preceded it,
the NCLBA follows the states' lead and punishes poor performance
by limiting or withdrawing authority over governance from officials
who fail to improve as required. Individual schools receiving federal
monies that fail to make adequate yearly progress are first subject
to the sanction pioneered by the State of Florida: pupils must be
offered the opportunity to enroll in other schools. 25" A program of
technical assistance to the school from the district must also
follow. Should a school nevertheless continue to fall short of
adequacy for two years after being identified as nonperforming, the
NCLBA requires the local district to take "corrective action" with
respect to that school. 25 ' Among the actions districts may consider
are to "[slignificantly decrease management authority at the school
level"257 and "[riestructure the internal organizational structure
of the school." 2 8 A third year of failure then triggers automatic
"alternative governance" sanctions: either conversion to a charter
school, reconstitution, private management, or state takeover.25 9
State takeover may be imposed so long as "permitted under State
law and agreed to by the State."2 6 °

254. See id. § 6311(b)(1).
255. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E)(i) (Supp. II 2002) with 1999 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
ch. 99-398 § 2 (West) (repealed 2003). For districts, this sanction operates as a financial
penalty for underperformance: departing with a transferring student is her allocation of perpupil state resources, an amount likely in excess of the marginal cost to the district of her
education. Transfer, however, has been greeted coolly by both parents and districts. "Only 1%
of eligible children in school year 2002-03 and just 2% in school year 2003-04 have taken
advantage of the NCLB choice option and moved to another public school." CENTER ON
EDUCATION POLICY, FROM THE CAPITAL TO THE CLASSROOM: YEAR 2 OF THE No CHILD LEFT

BEHIND ACT vii (Jan. 2004) [hereinafter YEAR 2 REPORT]. Districts seek to discourage choice
in order to prevent failing schools from emptying and successful ones from being overwhelmed
by transfers. See Elissa Gootman, City Will Limit Chance to Leave Failing Schools, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 17, 2004, at Al (discussing limitations on transfers in New York City and
Chicago).
256. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(D) (Supp. II 2002).
257. Id. § 6316(b)(7)(C)(iii).
258. Id. § 6316(b)(7)(C)(vi).
259. A catch-all provision permits states to impose governance changes not specifically
enumerated. Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(v).
260. See id. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(iv).
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Similar provisions apply to school districts.2 6 ' School districts are
identified as needing improvement if they fail to make adequate
yearly progress for two consecutive years.2 62 If a district needing
improvement again fails to make adequate yearly progress for two
more years, notwithstanding local plans and the required technical
assistance from the state, the state must undertake corrective
action.26 3 This must include at least one of several interventions,
including "[r]emoving particular schools from the jurisdiction of
the local educational agency and establishing alternative arrangements for [their] governance;"" "[a]ppointing, through the State
educational agency, a receiver or trustee to administer the affairs
of the local educational agency in place of the superintendent and
school board;"2 6 "[a ] bolishing or restructuring the local educational
agency;" 6 6 and providing students in the school district the
opportunity to transfer to other public schools.26 7 There is no effort
to disentangle whether the school or district is at fault; poor test
scores in a particular school count against both the school and its
parent district.
This system certainly looks like a state new accountability
program writ large. It seems fairly clear that the NCLBA's proponents felt they had recognized a successful initiative hatched in the
Brandeisian "laboratory" of the states2 66 and sought to mandate its
use nationwide. Because of the NCLBA, all states, even those not
already doing so, must hold their districts and schools accountable
under a standards-based policy and utilize sanctions that include
restricting or abolishing local governance.26 '
Like a shift from state-ordered to court-ordered accountability,
however, a nationalized accountability policy does not simply ratify
existing state accountability systems and provide for their replica261. See MORPHET ET AL., supra note 45, at 13-14 (noting that educational governance
occurs at "federal, state, intermediate, local, and site" levels).
262. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(c)(3) (Supp. II 2002).
263. Id. § 6316(c)(10).
264. Id. § 6316(c)(10)(C)(iv).
265. Id. § 6316(c)(10)(C)(v).
266. Id. § 6316(c)(10)(C)(vi).
267. Id. § 6316(c)(10)(C)(vii).
268. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(coining the phrase).
269. See supra text accompanying notes 244-45 and 262-67.
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tion elsewhere.27 ° Close examination demonstrates that the
NCLBA's accountability program will have effects quite different
from the state legislation upon which it is based. Suburban
districts, at little risk of disestablishment under state accountability programs, may under the NCLBA discover good reason to reform
their treatment of difficult-to-educate students, in order to forestall
outside intervention in their efforts. The NCLBA does not, however,
share the potential of state new accountability programs to push
very distressed districts to realign themselves toward the goal of
reform and to search for effective strategies for improvement.
Instead, the NCLBA will likely function in those districts in a
fashion similar to other command-and-control regulatory programs-which is to say, with little effect. Indeed, the federal
provisions may well have the collateral effect of torpedoing the
genuine hopes for such reform that state-based accountability
programs offer.
These conclusions rest on the reality that, notwithstanding its
rhetoric, the NCLBA is quite rigid as to state behavior. States have
genuine flexibility only as to two major decisions, neither of which
gives them much real control over the course of reform. First, states
may opt out of the program entirely; states are bound by the
governance sanctions in the NCLBA only if they wish to receive
ESEA funds.27 ' This is more or less a paper power, however; ESEA
is an important component of state school budgets, particularly for
the distressed schools and districts which serve populations in
which poverty is concentrated.272 It is difficult, perhaps impossible,
for a state to decline vital funds in order to avoid external accountability. 273 What is striking is that some states, after a few years of

270. Contra Sabel & Simon, supra note 117, at 1072 (claiming that the Act "partly
nationalize [s]" Texas's new-accountability program).
271. See Reichbach, supra note 8, at 669, 679 n.103.
272. Federal spending accounts for approximately 7% of nationwide educational spending.
See Rudalevige, supranote 4, at 25, 45. This percentage is considerably larger in districts with
high concentrations of poverty and students with disabilities.
273. Witness, for example, the enormous public outcry when the Los Angeles Unified
School District failed to apply for a relatively small state grant that required districts, as a
condition of funding, to accept disestablishment-like sanctions if educational outcomes did not
improve. See Doug Smith, Up to $20 Million Lost as L.A Schools' Gamble Fails, L.A. TIMEs,
Oct. 8, 1999, at B1.
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participation in the program, have begun to wonder aloud whether
forgoing ESEA funding might be the best course.274
Second, the NCLBA permits states to define their own academic
standards for adequacy.27 5 These must be achievement standards
based on testing; the power afforded the states is effectively to
select a criterion-based exam and then select the exam score that
represents "adequacy."2 76 The absolute requirement that there be
average yearly progress in standardized test performanceregardless which additional criteria are employed-imposes a
considerably more narrow definition of adequacy than that used by
some states. States may not, moreover, apply different standards
to different groups of students; nor are they granted more than
short-term flexibility to let those standards be ignored, to accept
progress on one front as evidence of good faith, to stretch the
timetables, or to make similar ad hoc modifications. Once the
standard for adequate yearly progress is established, it is essentially fixed.
In short, the NCLBA severely limits the discretion of higher-level
governments to decide whether to apply corrective measures,
including disestablishment, to entities below. Every school must
meet the NCLBA's definition of adequate yearly progress or face
corrective action. 27 ' Districts, therefore, cannot countenance longterm experiments in particular schools, or select individual schools
for demonstration projects, or choose to ignore problems associated
with particular schools, areas, or subpopulations. States cannot
274. See YEAR 2 REPORT, supra note 255, at 8, 9 (documenting serious proposals to reject
NCLBA funds or accept them with conditions in Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New Hampshire, and Vermont); Chuck Haga, Ruling Ignites Schools Debate;
Wisconsin Bucked No Child Left Behind; Other States Are Reacting, STAR-TRIBUNE
(Minneapolis), June 17, 2004, at 1A (noting that "state Attorney General Peg Lautenschlager
issued an opinion that Wisconsin has no legal obligation to implement the [NCLBA] law
because it fails to adequately fund the testing and other activities it requires"); Ryan, supra
note 3, at 933 n.9 (documenting state opposition to NCLBA).
275. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(B) (Supp. II 2002).
276. See Ryan, supra note 3, at 941-42 ("Although the Act is quite strict in defining AYP,
States are free to determine
it is remarkably loose with regard to state standards and tests....
their own standards, to create their own tests, and to determine for themselves the scores that
individual students must receive in order to be deemed 'proficient."). For proposals to amend
the NCLBA to require a federally specified test in reading and math, see Lynn Olson, No
Child Left Behind Act Changes Weighed, EDUC. WK, Sept. 22, 2004, at 31, 34.
277. See supra note 70.
278. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(B) (Supp. II 2002).
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elect to forgive low district test scores because of innovative
programs, select different subgroups for testing than the NCLBA
requires, focus exclusively on the worst-performing districts, reward
a district making dramatic but partial progress, or exclude specialeducation students from testing. After corrective action is triggered,
states have only limited discretion as to what sort of action to
undertake against districts, 9 and most options for corrective action
are quite draconian.
The NCLBA contemplates unambiguously that the threats of
school reconstruction and district disestablishment will spur
creative local reforms. It is presumably for this reason that the
statute is agnostic as to pedagogical method, with the very important exception that once districts are identified as needing improvement they must implement "strategies based on scientifically based
research,71280 a requirement denounced loudly in the educational
establishment.28 ' It is certainly for this reason that governancebased sanctions, twinned with "rewards" for high performance, are
incorporated into the NCLBA.2 82
As argued above, however, threats of disestablishment spur
district experimentation through a process also affected by districts'
incomplete information regarding state intentions and districts'
knowledge that states prefer to avoid imposing the sanction. 2" The
NCLBA, in contrast to the state legislation upon which it is
modeled, but similar to judicial mandates of school adequacy,
leaves little room for doubt as to what state standards are and
under what circumstances sanctions will be imposed. The combination of disestablishment threats, clear standards, and a lack of state
discretion results in a very different pattern than the one observed
in the states. In fact, it creates two different patterns: one for
districts that are relatively successful and one for those that are
not.

279. Id. § 6316(b)(3)(A). Districts face similar constraints vis-d-vis their constituent schools.
280. Id. § 6316(b)(3)(A)(i).
281. For examples of the establishment reaction to the regulatory preference for
"randomized experimental trial [s]"
and against "qualitative evidence," see Elizabeth Adams
St. Pierre, Refusing Alternatives:A Science of Contestation, 10 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY 130, 132
(2004); Glenn, supra note 21 (quoting skeptics of randomized trials in education research).
282. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. II 2002).
283. See supra Part I.D.
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Relatively successful districts are at little risk from state
accountability programs, which focus their firepower upon a state's
worst-performing districts.2 4 Under the NCLBA, however, even
districts with high test scores have been designated routinely as
failing because particular subgroups of students fail to demonstrate
adequate yearly progress. 8 5 Such districts are no less anxious than
those described in Part I to forestall limits upon their own authority; knowing such consequences to be inevitable, they gain every
incentive to reform their treatment of hard-to-educate students.
This is one of the most attractive features of the NCLBA. It forces
attention to underserved groups of students whose poor performance had previously been obscured by good results in the mainstream. It is a nice example of the rule that though programs which
allocate services to citizens are well-handled locally, only the
national government is positioned to insist successfully on redistribution.2 86 The NCLBA redistributes the attention of school officials
to students who would not get it otherwise.
The NCLBA has a second effect on relatively well-performing
districts: it makes enemies of them. Whatever their willingness
to try to reform the education they provide the poor, or specialeducation students, there is a real possibility of failure. Such
districts-and the states, which generally serve suburbanites'
educational interests-will surely embrace Ryan's prediction that
the NCLBA may lack staying power in a world where "education
reform is notoriously beset by fads." 287 But they will not stop there.
Instead, they will actively seek to weaken, delay, undermine, or
abolish the NCLBA and especially its sanctions provisions.'
284. See Moe, supra note 119, at 89.
285. See YEAR 2 REPORT, supra note 255, at vi.
286. See, e.g., PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 77 (1981).
287. See Ryan, supra note 3, at 985.
288. See Hess, supranote 3, at 63-64. The emphasis in states' critiques upon the claim that
the Act labels too many districts as failing suggests suburban power. See YEAR 2 REPORT,
supra note 255, at 24; Lynn Olson, States Dicker Over Changes to AYP Plans,EDUC. WK., July
14, 2004, at 1. Suburban power, in turn, explains why states would consider forgoing Title I
funds rather than submit to the Act's requirements. See supra note 274 and accompanying
text.
The response of the federal government to date has been to try to signal its commitment
to the NCLBA and its sanctions program. The Department of Education has cultivated a
hardline position, see Rudalevige, supra note 4, at 25, 45-46; SUNDERMAN, supra note 6, at 7.
But see Liebman & Sabel, supra note 128, at 1725 & n.85 (arguing that "regulations ... thus
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Improving education in generally adequate districts is well and
good, but "[tihe American public education system is not in crisis"
overall; the crisis lies in those relatively few, poor school districts
where "schools are failing miserably."2 8 9 Those districts are the
primary targets of state disestablishment threats: the threats as
to them are the most realistic, and the possibility that they could
avert those threats through achievable reform is also realistic. This
is simply not so under the NCLBA. Elmore may be wrong that
distressed districts are utterly paralyzed in the face of their
problems,2 9 but he is likely right that they have no plausible hope
of meeting a stiff requirement to maintain average yearly progress
over time. In light of this, the threat of governance sanctions is
essentially meaningless. It is easy to see why: just as districts that
are sure that they can avoid sanctions need not reform, districts
with no realistic hope of avoiding sanctions need not try. As Part
II.A observes in connection with judicial mandates, when standards
are both demanding and fixed, districts see no advantage in
expending resources to achieve partial victories.2 91 A district in an
all-or-nothing bind will behave similarly if it is certain of all and if
it is certain of nothing. The average yearly progress requirement
looks to these districts just like another unrealistic regulatory
demand from Washington's distant bureaucracy.
This is not to say that distressed districts are unmoved by the
looming sanctions. They are quite appalled by them, but reform is
not a realistic strategy for avoiding them. Instead, such districts
should be expected to concentrate on resistance, lending their
efforts to the campaign against federal sanctions.29 2 In this respect,
their interests coincide with those of the suburbs-a rare event.
They may, like suburban districts, make efforts to demonstrate that
far have served to relax, not stiffen, the NCLB's monitoring and enforcement mechanisms"),
relenting on some issues but so far refusing to weaken many implementing regulations widely
viewed as anachronistic or counterproductive. Particularly troubling is the potential for
sampling error caused by the testing provisions of the NCLBA that may overwhelm actual
information about a school's average yearly progress. See Gregory J. Fritzberg, Revise and
Resubmit: A CriticalResponse to Title One of the No Child Left Behind Act, 184 J. EDUC. 69,
78-80 (2004); Thomas J. Kane et al., Randomly Accountable, 2 EDUC. NEXT 57, 58-59 (2002).
289. HOCHSCHILD & SCOVRONICK, supra note 40, at 77.
290. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
291. See discussion supra Part IIA.
292. See supra note 105 (describing the use of public sentiment as a resistence tactic).
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some reform is possible, in order to buttress arguments that the
NCLBA's demands are unnecessary as well as unreasonable. Such
reforms, however, are not of the scope that the NCLBA seeks.
The NCLBA is in only the third year of its implementation.2 9 No
governance sanctions have been imposed; as yet all that has
happened is that some districts and schools have been required to
open themselves up to technical assistance and develop remedial
plans.29 4 It is an open question, therefore, whether the governance
sanctions with bite will ever be imposed.29 Put differently, schools
and districts may know the standards to which the federal government intends to hold them, but are not yet sure if the federal
government is the taking-over type. Will Washington, as it is now
intimating, go through with imposing governance sanctions on a
vast number of schools? Or will it back down--delaying sanctions
or introducing new flexibility-in the face of the number and power
of the failures?
If the federal government is not ultimately dissuaded from its
sanction threats, it will not only fail to spur reform in distressed
districts but also do serious harm to the state efforts to encourage
reform that might actually bear fruit. The federal government is
in a position vis-A-vis these districts much like that of state
courts contemplating disestablishment orders. Neither contemplates taking direct responsibility for disestablished systems.
Rather, each hopes to offload that responsibility upon the only
institution capable of handling it, the state. Even less than state
courts, the federal government is not in a position to run schools
directly. The NCLBA, however, will not-it cannot-transform
the state into a faithful agent of the federal government. States,
as Part I argues, do not want to bear the costs of disestablishing a district.2" They are willing to bear that cost in a few
districts nevertheless to foment reform elsewhere; but wholesale
293. YEAR 2 REPORT, supra note 255, at v.
294. See id. at ix, 57-58; Alan Richard, NCLB Law's Focus Turns To Districts:States Must
Identify Lagging Systems, EDUC. WL-, Sept. 15, 2004, at 1 ("More than two years after
President Bush signed the No Child Left Behind Act, the far-reaching federal education law
is beginning to bear down on school district performance.... [Tlhis year marks the first time
many districts could bump up against the designation [as "needing improvement"] under the
new law's more stringent formula.").
295. See Ryan, supra note 3, at 985-86.
296. See supra Part I.C.
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disestablishments of numerous underperforming districts do not
offer that upside, and disestablishing suburban districts has no
upside at all. Facing a federal demand to disestablish nevertheless,
the natural response of the state is to behave as a nonfaithful
bureaucratic agent and engage in paper compliance. The state will
implement, but halfheartedly. The record of disestablishments in
the states suggests that in districts actually subject to the sanctions, progress is hard to come by even when the state pursues it
enthusiastically.2 9 7Afortiori states engaged in "token compliance"2 98
are not going to create much educational progress.
The tragedy of the NCLBA is that, while leaving the problems of
distressed school systems essentially untouched, it requires states
to act in ways that undermine their own power to create change by
threatening disestablishment. It is in the making of threats, not in
their occasional execution, that the power of states to effect change
lies. Yet such threats lose their power if the threatened sanctions
will be swamped by a wave of bureaucratic disestablishments that
the state will be forced to implement anyway. If disestablishment
is inevitable, districts have no reason to try to forestall it. In
addition, if districts expect the states-unenthusiastic and perhaps
unwilling to take on the governance of so many places at once-to
implement those sanctions halfheartedly, then they have virtually
nothing to worry about. Instead of a loss of power, personnel will
chum; figureheads may fall but the essential power structure of
implementation will survive.29 9 This is a result that the educational
regime, looking out for its employment interests, can learn to live
with.
CONCLUSION: WHITHER THE EDUCATIONAL POLITY?

A final question must be posed. Instead of undertaking, with
uncertain success, the job of holding school districts accountable,
why not just abolish them? The most straightforward solution to the
297. See supra note 141-45 and accompanying text.
298. See KE1rL, supra note 231, at 8.

299. See, e.g., Rettig, supra note 141, at 241-45 (describing the persistence of local politics
in Jersey City despite the presence of state agents, the maneuvering and jockeying that took
place in Jersey City to capture power upon the exit of state officials, and the efficacy of passive
resistance).
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problem of the unaccountable school district and the difficulty of
breaking its monopoly over implementation would be to abandon
educational localism entirely. Such localism, after all, has confounded the effective implementation of a wide range of state and
federal priorities."' Localism also reinscribes inequality. When
localities are racially segregated and unequal in wealth and power,
schools reflect those divisions. Localism privileges the interests of
the wealthy, the well-organized, and the broadly dispersed groups
with interests that often diverge from those of the less-advantaged
students who need good public schools so desperately.0 1 And, as
this Article demonstrates, local governance introduces vast
complexity into education.
There is room to suggest that under conditions of substantial
local variation, government is more effective when its decisions are
made locally by people familiar with the facts on the ground. 30 2 This
is not, however, sufficient to commend educational localism. A
centralized system can organize itself into local offices that use local
expertise to tailor programs to local needs but that are in no sense
sovereign. In other words, central systems can employ street-level
bureaucrats. Welfare, for example, is run in this fashion; local
welfare offices, responding to local labor market conditions and
client population characteristics, implement a large number of
strategies to get clients back to work, but governance and
policymaking remains entirely at the state and federal levels. This
is also the paradigm for public education in most European
nations, making it particularly difficult to contend that local control
is the only possible model for effective service delivery.0 3 Finally,
the experience of local resistance to major educational policy
initiatives-desegregation, most prominently-demonstrates that
knowledge of local conditions and needs is too often accompanied by
excessive sympathy for them.

300. To take two very different examples in addition to the efforts to improve pedagogy and
educational outcomes discussed supra, localism has vastly complicated efforts to desegregate
schools and ban school prayer.
301. See MCDERMorr, supra note 80, at 22-25.
302. See id. at 18-20.
303. See William Lowe Boyd & Bonnie C. Johnson, Intergovernmental Relations in
Education,4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EDUC. 1215, 1216 (James W. Guthrie ed., 2d ed. 2003).
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American political culture, however, assigns loftier meaning to
local control than efficiency or effectiveness. For many decades,
Americans have regarded as a component of their political liberty
that they may participate as part of a local community in shaping
that community's educational system. 30 ' David Tyack critiques the
progressive "apolitical corporate model" of education, which opposed
"[tihe whole notion of representative lay democracy .. in urban
public education." °5 Although he does not use the term, for Tyack
school districts are polities, "'communities' ... through which people
define the objectives of their collective life. " "°6 The polity function of
school districts is important enough to Tyack that he, for one, would
apparently opt to retain educational localism if given the choice:
"Although districts and their school boards are flawed instruments
of democracy, if they disappeared, we would probably reinvent
something similar. Local control offers a chance to make collective
decisions about an important matter: the education of the next
generation."3 7 Michael Walzer's pluralist commitments similarly
lead him to "prefer]" schools that are "enclosure[s] within a
where children are brought together as students
neighborhood ...
exactly as they will one day come together as citizens" and that are
governed "close to home, among friends and familiar enemies."0 8
As new accountability programs reshape educational federalism
and the broader ecology of games that defines education policy, it is
worth considering how these changes affect school districts qua
polities. On one account, accountability and its disestablishment
sanction leaves most school district polities intact while constraining severely those found in poor, distressed communities. The
programs thus exacerbate the existing outcome, resource, and racial
inequalities of educational federalism by creating new, additional
inequalities in governance. The archetypal suburban school
district-a white-dominated institution with adequate budgets and
relatively easy-to-educate students-retains its traditional power
304. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 80, at 13-14.
305. See Tyack, supra note 14, at 18.
306. Martha Derthick, How Many Communities? The Evolution of American Federalism,
in DILEMMAS OF SCALE IN AMERICA'S FEDERAL DEMOCRACY 126 (Martha Derthick ed., 1999).
307. See Tyack, supra note 14, at 21 (citation omitted).
308. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 225
(1983).
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over its own affairs. Poor, minority-dominated districts in central
cities, rural areas, and first-ring suburbs, facing problems that
sometimes seem intractable-aging physical plants, students
physically and cognitively unready to learn, raging social problems-are now told that local control is contingent upon performance. Where wealthy local elites may govern freely the schools
their residents choose, the poor, without the funds to exit systems
that victimize their children, are now to be denied voice as well.
The unfairness, especially because it carries obvious racial dimensions, °9 is palpable.
In the final analysis, however, accountability is a more subtle
policy than this view suggests. The conflict between educational
quality and local control that it mediates mirrors a deeper tension
in American law and society regarding the nature of the school
district. A school district is a polity, in which a local community
comes together to provide what is not just a service but is the cradle
of its hopes and values, the foundation of its civic culture, and the
institutional glue of its community.3 1 ° But the school district is also
a state social-services agency, a technocratic agent that state
principals use to distribute educational services throughout a
state.3 1 ' Which is the district's true role? Accountability gives the
only reasonable answer to this question-it is both. Sensitive to the
susceptibility of local districts to capture by union and other
educational interests, and understanding that a community that
fails to educate its youth can enjoy only hollow self-governance, it
properly grants primacy to districts in their service aspect, insisting
that inadequate districts must reform. Accountability, nevertheless,
invites not only continued local experimentation regarding educational means but continued pursuit of local goals, even goals not
shared by state officials. It not only invites and encourages localities
to implement reform, but it permits them to help shape the reform
agenda.

309. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
310. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1973) ("In part, local
control means ... the opportunity it offers for participation in the decisionmaking process that
determines how those local tax dollars will be spent. Each locality is free to tailor local
programs to local needs.").
311. See Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 110(1967) ("[The County Board of Education
performs essentially administrative functions....").
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To be sure, accountability is costly. Districts trying to satisfy both
themselves and the state may choose a reform package that fails to
do one or the other, or even both. Districts must operate under
considerable and unavoidable uncertainty. Relationships between
state and district become more tense, racially fraught, and guarded.
Some districts, disestablished not primarily for their own failings
but in order to send a signal to their compatriots, may find that
they have been used as a means toward state goals having little to
do with them. None of these consequences is consistent with either
the goal of local self-governance or the goal of educational improvement.
Nevertheless, a system based on deterrence respects districts'
role as polities even as it insists that they respect their own role
as educational bureaucracies. Accountability offers a compelling
institutional structure in which to seek both educational reform and
local control. Localities retain the power not only to implement but
to make policy, even as they face greater accountability for their
policy choices. Some localities fail, at the cost of their self-determination, but others succeed. Certainly such a structure has far more
potential than judicially- or centrally-ordered reforms, which have
not only failed routinely to bring educational improvement where
it is most needed but have also, imposed from above, undermined
local control as much as disestablishment ever could.

